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Abstract: Much of the scholarly literature lauds cooperative federalism, in
which states regulate to achieve federal standards, as an innovative federal-state
partnership. But delegation of authority also has grave dangers caused by
principal-agent problems, among others. The largely toothless nondelegation
doctrine captures these challenges, but the bidirectional difficulties ofprincipals
adequately monitoring agencies, and vice versa, extend far beyond Congress's
delegation of duties to agencies. Congress or federal agencies-the principals
who craft and oversee cooperative federalism under many existing statutes-
sometimes delegate authority knowing that subfederal actors will not fully
implement a statute. Even delegation for more noble purposes can cause
regulatory failure when federal actors struggle or refuse to adequately oversee
subfederal agents or perform their own duties. Further, subfederal agents often
lack the tools needed to hold federal agencies to task. The recent case of Flint,
Michigan, where tainted drinking water permanently harmed thousands of
children due to flagrant violations of a cooperative federalism statute,
poignantly highlights this. But delegation is often necessary and can be
beneficial, particularly where subfederal agents are more motivated to
implement basic risk-preventing regulatory requirements than their federal
principal is. Broad-brush cooperative federalism theory tends to ignore the
regulatory design of delegation and its associated pathologies and benefits.
This Article cuts to the core of the dysfunction of delegated governance
regimes within cooperative federalism. It argues that given the federal statutes
in place-with requirements that even recalcitrant federal and state agencies
must follow the design and implementation of cooperative federalism must
change. Even if the original purpose of delegation was an ignoble one, the
baseline requirements offederal statutes may not and should not be ignored.
The Article builds a theoretical framework for understanding and
normatively assessing the sharedfeatures ofnumerous forms ofdelegation under
cooperative federalism, and it applies this framework to environmental and
energy law case studies. It argues that necessary regulatory design changes
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include, among others, consistent case-by-case and long-term monitoring of
both principals' (federal agencies) and agents' (subfederal governments')
behavior and expanded use of judicial review and other mechanisms for
overseeing all actors within delegated governance regimes.
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Introduction
In early 2016, a city-wide regulatory failure attracted national attention
when officials learned that Flint, Michigan's drinking water supply had been
contaminated with lead and other pollutants for months.' This largely low-
income minority community suffered from the irreversible effects of lead
poisoning, with the most severe impacts falling on the youngest members of the
population.2 A great deal of finger-pointing ensued, with agencies and politicians
3
citing to the refusal of officials at numerous levels to act despite warnings.
Review revealed severe breakdowns in interagency communication and a failure
of agencies at all levels to comply with minimum requirements of the federal
1. Examining Federal Administration of the Safe Drinking Water Act in Flint,
Michigan: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 114th Cong. (2016),
http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/examining-federal-administration-of-the-safe-drinking-water-act-in-
flint-michigan [http://perma.cc/UJ7V-YNK2].
2. See Chinaro Kennedy et al., Blood Lead Levels Among Children Aged <6 Years-
Flint, Michigan, 2013-2016, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 1, 2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm6525el.htm [http://perma.cc/492F-LYUM] (noting that
"very young children consume more water per unit of body mass than do older children and adults");
What Do Parents Need To Know To Protect Their Children?, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/acclpp/bloodleadlevels.htm [http://perma.cc/V4Z4-
3ZXG] ("Even low levels of lead in blood [in children] have been shown to affect IQ, ability to pay
attention, and academic achievement. And effects of lead exposure cannot be corrected.").
3. E.g., Examining Federal Administration of the Safe Drinking Water Act in Flint,
Michigan, Part 3: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 114th Cong. (2016)
[hereinafter Flint Hearing] (noting that a member of Congress called for the resignation of federal and
regional officials and criticizing the failure of the EPA to accept responsibility for the crisis).
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Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).4 Indeed, the principal ultimately responsible
for these cascading failures-the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-
failed for months to require the city and state to comply with the SDWA,
allowing lead poisoning and its irreversible effects to continue unabated. This
crisis represented a failure of agencies, including a failure to recognize a sorely
6underfunded state program for regulating the safety of drinking water, as well
as acts and omissions by individual officials and staff members.
The Flint crisis, which implicated city, county, state, regional, and national
agencies and policymakers, sheds light on the broader challenges that arise from
a common, inadequately-studied phenomenon: federal government actors
relying on subfederal entities to do much of the heavy lifting in identifying and
regulating risks. The SDWA-like most environmental statutes and many other
federal directives-relies on "cooperative federalism," a broad category of
regulatory approaches characterized by the federal government delegating some
or most of the implementation of federal requirements to subfederal actors.
Indeed, the delegation that occurs within the broad rubric of cooperative
federalism is quite expansive, involving many types and degrees of delegated
authority. In the examples explored in this Article, Congress directed agencies
to delegate some or most of their authority,8 or agencies used discretionary
powers under enabling statutes and chose to delegate. Despite much of the
literature's tendency to hail cooperative federalism, broadly construed, as an
innovative, effective federal-state partnership,9 all of these forms of delegation
4. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Final Report, OFF. GOVERNOR RICK SNYDER
(Mar. 2016), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_FINALREPORT_21March2016
517805 7.pdf [http://perma.cc/WNW7-2BYC].
5. See infra notes 134-140 and accompanying text.
6. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 27 ("Michigan is particularly
challenged because f es to operate the [SDWA] program are generally lower than fees charged by other
states, requiring the state to rely more heavily on general funds and federal revenue."); id. at 50 ("Prior to
Flint's water supply conversion, EPA's delegation of primacy for enforcement of the SDWA in Michigan
had been challenged by a series of disagreements and concerns over compliance requirements and
sampling practices.").
7. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1811-12 (2008) ("In
its simplest form, cooperative federalism is a system of shared authority between the federal and state
governments. Typically, Congress delegates broad regulatory authority to a federal agency (such as
standards setting, enforcement, and permitting) and authorizes the agency to delegate program
implementation to states that satisfy certain requirements."); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to
Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 719, 740 (2006) (explaining that a unifying principle of cooperative federalism is Congress's
creation of a "significant role for the states either in implementing the federal standards or in
supplementing federal regulatory initiatives").
8. See infra notes 157, 220 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism when Numbers Matter More
than Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 238, 246 n.26 (2014) (summarizing the literature that praises
the Clean Air Act-the original cooperative federalism statute-as a template for cooperative federalism
more generally); William W. Buzbee, Federalism Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism's
InstitutionalDiversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 98 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (exploring the benefits
of cooperative federalism regimes in which states regulate above a minimum federal floor, although noting




share a common principal-agent flaw that arises from their regulatory design.'0
The constitutional nondelegation doctrine-now a narrow, infrequently-applied
rule" that requires Congress to provide agencies with adequately detailed
directives when delegating policymaking authority-captured the essence of this
problem. But the principal-agent undertones of the doctrine bleed far beyond its
narrow confines, permeating numerous forms of delegation within cooperative
federalism regimes. Federal agencies struggle, or refuse, to adequately oversee
subfederal parties responsible for basic regulatory duties, as dramatically
demonstrated through the Flint crisis. Just as importantly, federal agencies
sometimes fail to carry out their basic responsibilities as principals, or even
thwart motivated subfederal agents from adequately regulating risks, and
subfederal agents sometimes lack the necessary tools and resources to
independently act or hold their federal principals to task.
The principal-agent problem in cooperative federalism is thus a decidedly
bidirectional problem.12 From the top down, principals that rely on other entities
to implement existing federal requirements struggle to provide adequately
detailed yet flexible directives to their agents, oversee and enforce agent
responsibilities while minimizing transaction costs, and step in where agents fail
(arguing that cooperative federalism, used in most federal environmental statutes, is a "constraint on the
capacity of either level of government to take effective steps to protect the environment"); Michael S.
Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 559, 579 (2000) (arguing that cooperative
federalism suffers from an accountability problem because it "separates political initiative and authorship
from responsibility for results").
10. See M.C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (defining the principal-agent "relationship as a contract under which one or
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent"). There is a broad literature on
the principal-agent problem when Congress delegates power to agencies, but there is less discussion of
how the same problems pervade cooperative federalism regimes. For discussion of the principal-agent
problem in the Congress-agency relationship and the literature that explores this problem, see JR.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to ControlDelegatedPower, 81 TEx. L. REV.
1443, 1452-56 (2003). For discussion of the principal-agent concept in the context of the nondelegation
doctrine, see, for example, Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1743-44 (2002), which argues that there is no such thing as delegation of legislative
responsibility to executive agencies (because agencies are simply exercising executive, not legislative,
power), and notes that under any form of delegation, "a leader or principal delegates broad authority to
agents."
11. See, e.g., Richard D. Cudahy, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Rumors of Its
Resurrection Prove Unfounded, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 2-3, 38 (2002) (noting that in
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), the lower court had used the doctrine to
strike down a statute, which the Supreme Court had not done "for more than 60 years," and concluding
that following the Court's reversal of this lower court decision, under American Trucking, "it is difficult
to see . .. how Congress could violate the nondelegation doctrine"); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (allowing congressional delegation f authority to other actors provided
that Congress provides an "intelligible principle" with which the delegate "is directed to conform"); Lisa
Schulz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative
State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1404 (2000) (describing Hampton as the "most familiar judicial formulation
of the nondelegation doctrine").
12. See, e.g., Cudahy, supra note 11, at 3 (noting how the nondelegation doctrine was
designed in part to make Congress more accountable and force it to make "hard choices" rather than
passing them off to another entity).
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to carry out these responsibilities.13 And changes like the election of President
Trump-a dramatic shift in executive leadership-highlight a phenomenon that
has long lurked in U.S. law. Due to political ideology, capture,14 or other
incentives or disincentives, the principals themselves-in this case, Congress,
federal agencies, and the executive branch more generally-are sometimes
openly averse to requiring agents to carry out existing federal directives, even
those designed to prevent basic market failures or risks. 5 And they often
delegate as a means of obscuring their motives, leaving hard decisions to other
levels of government, or otherwise avoiding clear esponsibilities under existing
statutes.16 In these cases, subfederal agents-even those motivated to carry out
their duties under the delegated governance scheme _struggle to hold their
federal principals to task8 for failing to uphold their end of the cooperative
federalism problem, or they lack the needed authority or resources to act
independently. 19
Yet delegation, with its bidirectional oversight challenges and deeply
politicized nature, is not universally dysfunctional. When federal agents refuse
to act or are prohibited from carrying out their duties under existing federal
statutes, subfederal actors with adequate resources and discretion can choose to
pick up the slack.20 And even willing federal policymakers and agencies simply
13. See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 10, at 1451 (noting the concern that
Congress cannot adequately control its agents); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10 (describing monitoring
and enforcement concerns that run both ways in the principal-agent relationship within the context of the
firm).
14. For extensive discussion of the ability of special interests to capture governments
operating within delegation regimes, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 49-57 (1993).
15. See id. at 80 (arguing that Congress purposefully piled increasingly complex rules
on the states under the Clean Air Act, knowing that "it was unworkable," and that "legislators seem to be
unconcerned about imposing delay, complexity, and confusion on their constituents when they delegate");
John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1186, 1199
(1995) (observing that "[i]nterest groups and politicians opportunistically exploit the fragmentation of the
federalist system to achieve their short-term goals" and providing examples of political groups that laud
"state autonomy" only when it achieves their substantive goals and quickly shift to support preemption
when states take an opposite substantive tack).
16. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 14, at 10 (describing delegation designed for
blame-shifting).
17. For a discussion of why states and local governments are sometimes motivated to
fill federal gaps in the environmental area and examples of ambitious efforts by these entities, see, for
example, Glicksman, supra note 7, at 779-86. Relatedly, William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental
Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 47-56 (1997),
provides a description of instances in which states have acted to implement relatively stringent standards
that provides potential explanations for why states might do so but also provides examples of resistance
to ambitious environmental regulation at the state level.
18. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 14, at 80 (noting that "EPA met fewer than 15
percent of the rulemaking deadlines set under the 1970 and 1977" Clean Air Act amendments).
19. For examples of administrations thwarting attempted independent action by state
agents, see infra note 110.
20. Cf Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers,




cannot, and, often should not, attempt to address each and every societal problem
that requires a regulatory solution.21 There are important opportunities for
innovative and effective governance in regimes involving delegated regulatory
power. With better regulatory design, delegation regimes could consistently take
advantage of these benefits and avoid the central causes of dysfunction.
A framework for understanding the regulatory design of delegation within
cooperative federalism regimes is necessary to understand and analyze the deep
dysfunction of delegation as well as its potential. This Article takes on this task,
categorizing central regulatory design elements of cooperative governance
regimes for understanding, critiquing, and improving numerous types of
delegated governance r gimes. After identifying common features of disparate
delegation forms within cooperative federalism, the Article applies this
framework to environmental and energy law case studies that demonstrate the
panoply of delegation types and the benefits and drawbacks of these approaches.
The Article uses the framework, and the lessons from case studies, to inform how
the regulatory design of delegated regimes could improve.
Part I of the Article explores the broad contours of the concept of delegation
within cooperative federalist regimes and the principal-agent challenge that
permeates all delegated governance forms. It describes three primary meanings
of "delegation." These include: 1) Congress's general act of delegating
responsibilities to agencies, constrained only by the relatively weak
nondelegation doctrine in the Constitution; 2) Congress's specific directives to
federal agencies requiring them to delegate certain responsibilities to subfederal
actors, as is the case under most environmental statutes; and 3) agencies'
discretionary decision to delegate certain responsibilities to subfederal actors,
constrained only by agencies' enabling statutes. These latter two categories both
generally fall within the rubric of cooperative federalism because they involve
subfederal actors in the project of achieving federal goals, regardless of whether
Congress or an agency has initiated the delegation. Part I explores how the
constitutional nondelegation doctrine, despite its waning force, embodies
principal-agent concepts that bleed well beyond the Constitution into delegated
governance regimes.
Having explored the common principal-agent thread that connects
numerous forms of delegation, including delegation from agencies and Congress
21. For the extensive literature on the benefits of including numerous institutions within
the regulatory project, see, for example, id, which explores the benefits of subfederal "checks" and
abilities to fill in gaps; Buzbee, supra note 9, at 2-3, which observes that "states have predictably copied
and sometimes improved on federal innovations and eroded the often more inflexible and bureaucratic
EPA's preeminence as an environmental regulator"; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997), which analyzes the benefits and risks of industry
involvement in the regulatory process; Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1131 (2012), which explores both the benefits and drawbacks of
overlapping institutions; and Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 47-48 (2010), which notes the importance of involving groups at numerous levels in the
governance project.
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to subfederal entities, Part II then provides a framework for evaluating the
regulatory design of delegated governance regimes within cooperative
federalism. I propose that all of these regimes, despite their seemingly limitless
contours, share three common features. These features influence the extent to
which these regimes suffer from classic principal-agent challenges of inadequate
guidance and oversight or demonstrate unusual and innovative means of
maintaining accountability in delegated governance r gimes.
First, the type of regulatory work that the entity with delegated authority
performs varies in terms of whether it drafts and promulgates regulations,
monitors compliance with those regulations, and enforces compliance, or only
carries out some of these functions. Second, the degree of authority held by the
delegated entity differs based on the federal agency's back-up authority (federal
action only when the state fails to act) or parallel authority (federal action
alongside the state).22 The extent to which the federal entity can and does
perform ongoing review of the delegated entity's individual actions and this
entity's overall performance of its duties similarly affects the degree of control
delegated. Finally, the entities to whom the federal agency allocates
responsibility, such as local and state governments, regional gencies, or private
organizations, are far more varied than the legal literature typically
23acknowledges.
In identifying the three common features of delegated governance regimes
and their role in enhancing or constraining principal-agent problems, Part II uses
case studies both to help describe these features and to demonstrate how this
framework can be used to allow for effective comparison of many types of
delegated governance regimes. I deploy studies from environmental and energy
law, exploring the regulation of oil and gas waste disposal, air pollutant
emissions, electric grid reliability, and drinking water quality.
Part II uses these examples because they represent the divergent points
along the broad continuum of delegation designs that fall beneath the general
rubric of cooperative federalism. They also show areas in which Congress or
agencies seem to genuinely desire a regulatory result, and others in which the
aim appears more suspect. There is general agreement that we must maintain the
reliability of the electric grid so that businesses and individuals have access to a
22. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 585-87 (2011)
(describing parallel regimes).
23. Other discussions of cooperative federalism and regulatory design use different
metrics, although some of them encompass aspects of the categories framed here. As an example, for areas
of rapidly evolving risk, David Markell and Robert Glicksman provide a framework for analyzing which
actors should be involved in the regulatory regime, such as states and civil society representatives, in
addition to federal agencies; the best legal or informal mechanisms for achieving regulatory goals, such
as issuing regulations or policy statements; and the specific tools for reaching these goals, such as
enhanced technological monitoring of compliance and making compliance or noncompliance more
transparent. David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and Application,




24constant and adequate supply of electricity. Enforcing basic standards for
minimum drinking water quality is also an issue that receives bipartisan support,
25or at least lip service. The oil and gas context represents the other extreme, in
which an agency delegated most of its regulatory responsibilities under a federal
environmental act-the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-with
knowledge that states had not, and likely would not, fully carry out their
26authority.
Finally, Part III of the Article identifies regulatory design features from the
three categories of the delegation framework the type of authority delegated,
degree of authority delegated, and the entity to whom the delegation occurs-
that can limit the principal-agent problems inherent to delegation. It argues that
the most important normative improvement within delegated governance
regimes would be to strengthen tools that allow federal principals to better
monitor and hold to task subfederal actors, both with respect to short-term
actions and longer-term performance, and for subfederal actors to similarly
oversee their federal principals. Specifically, it emphasizes the importance of
consistent, effective oversight mechanisms within cooperative federalism,
including tools for reviewing both the individualized actions of principals as well
as agents exercising delegated authority and the overall performance of federal
principals and their subfederal agents. This calls for potential sunsetting or softer
deadlines that would require periodic renewal or rejection of the delegated
governance regime, improved citizen suit features, more consistent review of
entities that exercise responsibilities within the delegated governance regime,
27and the involvement of agencies external to those entities involved in
regulatory work to perform some of these review functions. These external
agencies which I call "review agencies"-are primarily tasked with analyzing
the efficacy of agencies and the regulations that they implement. Part III also
documents how parallel federal agency authority to write, monitor compliance,
and enforce regulation alongside the delegated entity's powers is particularly
important when all of these regulatory functions have been delegated, and how
24. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (requiring federal regulation of electric grid reliability in a rare
bipartisan statute with ambitious substantive goals).
25. See, e.g., Flint Hearing, supra note 3 (observing that the "EPA has failed to
significantly update the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and the Lead and Copper rule since 1991"
despite directives to do so and criticizing the EPA for refusing "to take responsibility for not taking quick
and decisive action in Flint and . . . not [holding] anyone accountable for their failures").
26. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
27. The Article explores how several of these agencies already operate in other contexts
and have improved federal regulation. For example, the sole function of the National Transportation
Safety Board is to investigate the cause of transportation accidents, such as rail collisions and derailments
and flight crashes, and to suggest needed changes to regulation. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Negotiated
Rulemaking and New Risks: A Rail Safety Case Study, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 207, 214 (2017);
About the National Transportation Safety Board, NAT'L TRANsP. SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov
/about/pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/6KYX-DWSD] (describing how the role of the NTSB
improved the National Railroad Commission's rail safety regulations after oil train derailments and
explosions increased).
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in determining the type of functions to delegate, the comparative advantages of
different levels of government should be more closely examined.
In an age of increasing delegation and growing calls for abdication of
certain federal regulatory control, a means of better evaluating delegation
decisions and how to best design and implement federal agency delegation is
critical. Without this framework and an understanding of the dysfunction within
delegation, numerous risks could remain unidentified or inadequately controlled,
with some leading to substantial, potentially irreversible harm. Further,
policymakers and agencies making delegation decisions need an organized,
understandable set of delegation options from which to choose and an associated
normative framework that describes how delegation might be most effectively
accomplished. This Article builds that framework.
I. Understanding Delegated Governance and Its Principal-Agent Challenge
The concept of delegation encompasses numerous regimes and doctrines
involving the transfer of responsibility from one entity to another. This Part
explores the contours of this doctrine and the type of delegation that is the focus
of this Article-federal agencies' transfer of regulatory responsibility to
subfederal entities, either under a specific directive of Congress or through
discretionary interpretation of enabling legislation, both of which fall within the
general rubric of cooperative federalism. This Part then extends the basic
principal-agent focus of the nondelegation doctrine to delegated governance
regimes, exploring agency law as a unifying thread that ties together the many
forms of delegation.
A. The Many Forms ofDelegation
Delegation is such a broad concept hat it threatens to defy distinction or
productive parsing. But a closer look at delegation among bodies of government
(as opposed to delegation that also occurs within these bodies, such as from
agency heads to staff members28), defines useful dividing lines and means of
focusing scholarly discussion on more limited aspects of delegation.
With respect to the many uses of the term "delegation," the constitutional
nondelegation doctrine which is of limited use but worthy of brief discussion-
addresses Congress's general practice of transferring certain policymaking
responsibilities to agencies. This doctrine contains the weak yet not-entirely-
28. This, too, is of course an important aspect of delegation. See, e.g., DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 10 (exploring this form of delegation as well as delegation among institutions);
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135, 137
(1957) (arguing that principal-agent models are deficient in that they fail to "face the fact that governments




defunct requirement29 that Congress provide adequately "intelligible principles"
for agencies to follow when Congress initiates this type of transfer.30 Second,
"delegation" describes Congress's specific directives to agencies to delegate
some or most of their regulatory authority in a particular substantive area to
subfederal entities, such as through the classic cooperative federalism scheme
crafted by the Clean Air Act.31 And federal agencies sometimes delegate
authority to subfederal entities using discretionary powers granted to them by
Congress, either broadly interpreting an enabling statute or acting within specific
flexibility created by Congress. For example, in the oil and gas case study in Part
II, Congress directed the EPA to determine whether the Agency or states should
be primarily responsible for regulating oil and gas wastes under the Federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.32 The EPA chose to transfer most of
its authority to state actors.33
These latter two categories both receive their own label of "cooperative
federalism"-a term that describes a variety of delegation scenarios in which
subfederal entities partner with federal agencies in the regulatory project.34
Typically, this means that subfederal entities are partially or mostly responsible
for implementing and achieving specific federal standards, such as limits on the
quantity of pollutants in the ambient air or the level of acceptable contaminants
in drinking water. But more broadly construed, it also includes areas in which
various levels of government are involved in achieving more generalized federal
goals, or both general and specific goals. For example, in the sphere of
maintaining the reliability of the electricity supply-a case study explored in Part
II-Congress in 2005 directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to receive recommendations for the content of reliability standards from
a newly-formed, subfederal, public-private entity.35 FERC maintains the
36
ultimate responsibility for approving or rejecting these standards, but the
content of the specific regulatory goals comes initially from a subfederal level.
29. But see Cudahy, supra note 11, at 3 (arguing that the doctrine is largely defunct);
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 1721 (arguing that the doctrine simply does not apply to
congressional delegation to agencies).
30. See sources cited supra note 11.
31. Adelman, supra note 9, at 244 (noting that the Clean Air Act "established the model
for cooperative federal-state r gulation found in the major national environmental laws").
32. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration,
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,455-56 (July 6, 1988).
33. Id.
34. See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 183 (2005) (defining cooperative federalism as governance regimes in which
"both levels of government [state and federal] play some role).
35. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1211(a), 119 Stat. 594, 941
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2012)) (providing that "[t]he Electric Reliability Organization shall file
each reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard that it proposes to be made effective
under this section with the Commission" and granting FERC the authority to approve each standard or to
disapprove the standard "in whole or in part").
36. Id.
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FERC and the subfederal entity retain joint responsibility for enforcing these
standards once they are finalized.37
B. The Principal-Agent Problem Within Delegation
A challenge that pervades all forms of delegation is the fact that delegation
embodies a sort of principal-agent relationship, in which one entity, the principal,
relies on another, the agent, to do some or much of its work. In more technical
terms, one party, "designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as a
representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of
decision problems."38 At their core, principal-agent arrangements involve
individuals or other entities forming "relationships of authority and power
among themselves."3 9
In the governmental context, the principal-agent relationship is somewhat
different from the term as it is used in other legal contexts, such as in corporate
law. For example, in corporate law this relationship means that "directors are
agents of the firm's shareholders"40 and owe fiduciary duties to them, although
there are competing theories of directors' roles.41 Recent legal literature has
42attempted to assign a similar fiduciary-type role to governmental actors, such
as Congress, but there are substantial differences between firms and
governmental actors that challenge this analogy.43 As Seth Davis observes,
unlike areas in which "courts have defined the metes and bounds of the corporate
director's duty of loyalty . . . . There is no similar consensus on the ends of
administrative or constitutional law." 44
Despite the definitional confines of the principal-agent relationship within
certain areas of the law, this relationship has been used-for better or worse-to
45describe and critique a variety of relationships, including governmental ones.
37. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
38. Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 134, 134 (1973).
39. Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 265, 271 (1998).
40. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290 (1999).
41. Id. at 258-59, 269-72 (critiquing the principal-agent theory as applied in corporate
law and proposing an alternative approach, arguing that principal-agent models ignore factors uch as
agents' difficulties holding principals to task).
42. See, e.g., Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1145, 1147-48 (2014) (summarizing this literature).
43. See generally id. (critiquing the theory that would assign certain fiduciary duties to
public officials and noting differences between public officials and, for example, corporate managers).
44. Id. at 1166.
45. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 249 (noting that "the public corporation
is hardly unique in its use of agents" and that "[o]ther organizational forms, including partnerships,
proprietorships, privately-held corporations, and limited liability companies, also routinely do business
through hired managers and employees," but acknowledging that the use of the principal-agent theory as
an analytical tool is limited); Orts, supra note 39, at 273-74 (noting principal-agent relationships in the




The principal-agent concept provides a useful, albeit imperfect,46 method of
understanding some of the challenges at the heart of delegation. The theory
focuses too much on the unidirectional challenge of the principal finding least-
cost ways of ensuring that the agent acts as the principal has requested, despite
the principal's inability to constantly monitor the agent.4 7 But more recent work
views agency theory as a "two-way street," with principals' failure to fulfill their
responsibilities sometimes described as "sharking," in contrast to agencies'
"shirking."4 8 And the problems of principal-agent relationships as defined in the
economics and political science literatures, such as principals' difficulty
monitoring agents to ensure that agents do not act in ways that impede principals'
goals (and vice versa),49 pervade the federal-state relationship, too.
1. Principal-Agent Core Principles
The principal-agent challenge, as theorized and described in the economics
literature, is more of a utilitarian than value-based problem. Economists note
principals' need for agents to help carry out tasks-in the context of the firm, for
example-and the difficulties that principals encounter in attempting to provide
adequate direction to agents and to monitor and enforce agents' behavior. One
classic article exploring the theory describes the principal-agent relationship as
one in which "one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some
decision making authority to the agent.,5 0 Within this relationship, the principal
is concerned that the agent will "diverge[] from his interest" and will attempt to
limit this problem by providing adequate up-front directives and incentives for
hewing to the principal's goals, as well as incurring monitoring costs over time.5
The agent, in turn, will to some extent have its own incentives to act in the
interest of the principal (the agent, after all, reaps certain benefits from being
134 (noting that "[e]xamples of agency are universal .... Essentially all contractual arrangements, as
between employer and employee or the state and the governed, for example, contain important elements
of agency.").
46. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14
ACAD. MGMT. REv. 57, 57 (1989) (noting the limits of using agency theory in a variety of contexts and
scholars' critique of agency theory as failing to address specific problems or being too narrow).
47. Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 759 (arguing that mathematical principal-agent
models fail to address the scenario in which "the agent might have trouble getting the principal to perform
her end of the deal"); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis ofthe Principal-Agent Problem,
51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983) (focusing on this problem).
48. Orts, supra note 39, at 279-280.
49. See, e.g., id. at 275-76 (describing the typical approach to agency costs, which
focuses on monitoring difficulties and bonding as a solution).
50. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 308.
51. Id. Bonding, too-in which the goals of the agent and principal are somehow bound
together through monetary and other agreements-also helps to solve this problem. See, e.g., Grossman
& Hart, supra note 47, at 7-8 (noting that the typical proposal for addressing the principal-agent problem
is "to suppose that the principal chooses the risk-sharing contract, or incentive scheme, to maximize his
expected utility"); Orts, supra note 39, at 275-76 (describing the typical approach to agency costs, which
focuses on monitoring difficulties and bonding as a solution).
245
Yale Journal on Regulation
tasked with carrying out the principal's duties) and to monitor the principal to
52ensure that the principal upholds its end of the bargain.
The economics literature on principal-agent theories within the firm
acknowledges that the principal-agent challenges within delegation extend more
broadly, including to governments.3 And indeed, within the legal and political
science literatures, the principal-agent challenge that pervades Congress's
delegation of responsibility to agencies is widely discussed.54 The legal literature
explores in depth the principal-agent problems that arise between Congress and
agencies specifically although not typically with respect to the design and
outcomes of delegated governance regimes.
2. The Nondelegation Doctrine and Agency
The principal-agent problem at the heart of Congress's delegation to
agencies is also embodied in the nondelegation doctrine itself As Judge Richard
Cudahy explains, the doctrine "encourages accountability on the part of
Congress, which will be less able, if it has to make the hard choices itself, to
claim credit for the successes of its programs while blaming the failures on their
implementation by the regulatory agencies."56
The few courts that have used the doctrine to strike down federal laws have
also noted the principal-agent theme that it embodies. The most familiar, early
formulation of the doctrine emerged in J W. Hampton v. United States5 7 where
the Supreme Court held that "[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
52. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 308.
53. Id. at 309.
54. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 6 (1978).
55. DeShazo and Freeman note the consensus within the principal-agent delegation
literature that "delegation is dangerous because by assigning decisionmaking power to non-elected
bureaucrats, Congress risks losing control over policy outcomes." DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 10, at
1452. Jerry Mashaw frames the dominant principal-agent heme within the delegation literature as
involving "the linkage between legislative and administrative action," in which "agencies are created and
empowered in order to implement policy choices made in the legislative process"-in other words,
agencies are viewed as the agents of Congress. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 106 (1997). But Mashaw argues that a simple principal-
agent focus is far too narrow, noting that agencies have much more stand-alone authority in practice. Id.;
see also Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform
Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1398
(2011) (arguing that "agency delays constitute a principal-agent problem that raises democratic
accountability concerns when foot-dragging stems from divergent policy preferences of the agency itself,
a regulated interest group, or a competing political principal acting outside the legislative process,"
although noting that some delays result in Congress hobbling agencies' ability to act and thus making
them dysfunctional).
56. Cudahy, supra note 11, at 3.
57. 276 U.S. 394 (1928). Earlier cases already had espoused the principle, however,
portraying it in terms of allowing Congress to seek the assistance of other branches in fact-finding. See




legislative power."5 8 Noting the widely-accepted law of "agency" within the
public and common law, the Court began its analysis by recognizing the shared
principle delegate potestas non potest delegari, which prohibits the delegation
59of powers that already have been delegated. In the context of governance,
pieces of the general duty to govern (originally held by the public) already have
been delegated to each of the three governmental branches, and a second
delegation of these duties is unconstitutional if not crafted correctly.60 The Court
subsequently used the doctrine only twice to strike down legislation,6' thus
making the nondelegation doctrine largely a footnote within broader discussions
of delegation. But it provides a convenient starting point from which to pull still-
relevant principal-agent lessons into a common form of delegation that is very
much alive and frequently used: cooperative federalism.
3. The Principal-Agent Problem in Cooperative Federalism
The cooperative federalism literature has not focused as extensively on the
principal-agent challenges that pervade the federal-subfederal relationship, as
opposed to the Congress-agency relationship.62 Yet principal-agent-type
problems are accentuated at this level. With agencies delegating certain
regulatory roles to states, either at the specific directive of Congress or by using
their discretionary powers, there are at least two layers of delegation, first from
63Congress to the agency and then from the federal to the subfederal level.
Indeed, sometimes the delegation cascades even farther. As shown in the case
studies below, agencies acting within a cooperative federalism regime often
enlist several layers of subfederal actors, including states, private industry, and
local governments. Under the SDWA, the EPA relies on many local governments
to implement the Act; these governments own and operate the water treatment
and delivery systems and are responsible for complying with state laws that
58. J W Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 405.
60. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 1733 (observing that he maxim means
that "the legislature may not redelegate the powers delegated to it by the people," although arguing that
there is "remarkably little evidence that the Framers envisioned such a constraint on legislative authority"
and noting the three governmental branches' obligations regarding actual administration of the
government).
61. Cudahy, supra note 11, at 2.
62. However, a growing literature has revealed nuanced forms of shared governmental
authority that exist within this cooperative federalism structure and at its fuzzy edges. Scholars like
William Buzbee have documented and analyzed the important differences in state standards that augment
federal requirements, exploring regimes in which states regulate above minimum federal standards (a
regulatory "floor," such as a minimum level of environmental quality) and in which the federal
government sets a ceiling of standards. Buzbee, supra note 9, at 98-114; see also Greve, supra note 9
(exploring accountability problems in cooperative federalism).
63. Justin Weinstein-Tull extensively explores the accountability problems created by
states' delegation or abdication of federal responsibilities to local governments. See Justin Weinstein-Tull,
Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (2017).
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implement the SDWA and federal drinking water standards, and they often enlist
64
private consultants to help with this task.
a. Barriers to Monitoring and Bonding Agents
The central principal-agent challenge that pervades cooperative federalism
regimes is one of monitoring. From the perspective of ensuring good
performance of the subfederal entities, federal agencies can and sometimes do
require subfederal agents to report information to them, as Jessica Bulman-Pozen
notes.65 Federal agencies often lack the staff or money-or sometimes the
incentives-to adequately monitor these entities, as discussed in detail in the
case studies in Part II. Additionally, in some respects, federal agencies lack the
types of monitoring and enforcement tools available in other contexts. For
example, the federal government cannot hold out a direct threat of "firing" its
state agents. Federal agencies can withdraw states' primacy, reclaiming their
direct responsibility over regulatory programs.66 But in light of already-stretched
federal budgets and staff as well as political resistance from states, agencies are
extremely hesitant to use this "nuclear" option and rarely do so.67 Similarly, the
federal statutes that allow agencies to withdraw certain funding for states if states
fail to carry out their delegated duties meet stiff political resistance and, after
National Federal of Independent Business v. Sebelius,68 might be
constitutionally suspect.69
Bonding mechanisms to link federal and state incentives in the cooperative
federalism context are also somewhat limited. For example, there is no
contingency fee in the regulatory context as there is in the principal-agent client-
attorney context.70 But the federal government can use a variety of tools to cajole
subfederal agents. For example, in the immigration context the government has
in some cases simply "asked" local and state agencies to share information on
64. See infra Section I.B. 1.
65. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, supra note 20, at 475.
66. See, e.g., Markus G. Puder & Michael J. Paque, Tremors in the Cooperative
Environmental Federalism Arena, 24 TEMP. J. SC. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 71, 87-88 (2005) (discussing the
rare EPA threats and proceedings to withdraw certain state primacy under the Safe Drinking Water Act);
infra note 194 and accompanying text (noting the EPA's responsibility under the Clean Air Act for issuing
a federal implementation plan when a state's program does not meet federal requirements).
67. Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review:
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 331-32 & n.12 (2013)
(describing primacy withdrawal as a "nuclear" option and observing the "EPA has rarely initiated a
withdrawal proceeding on its own," although providing rare examples in which the EPA withdrew or
threatened to withdraw primacy).
68. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
69. Jonathan H. Adler & Nathanial Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?
Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q.
671 (2016) (arguing that the provision within the Clean Air Act under which the EPA must withdraw
highway funds for certain failures of state CAA programs could be unconstitutional).
70. Orts, supra note 39, at 276 (providing the contingency fee as an example of bonding




illegal immigrants, has made certain databases and other useful sources of
information more accessible to these agencies in an effort to encourage them to
share information, and has offered funding only if they complied with federal
71immigration statutes.
At the level of substantively overseeing the enforcement efforts of
subfederal entities under a delegated governance r gime, the federal government
has certain tools for ensuring that states are holding up their end of the bargain.
Again, as noted by Bulman-Pozen, cooperative federalism regimes have a
variety of enforcement designs. Sometimes tates must give notice of planned
enforcement before moving forward-thus allowing the federal government to
choose to enforce instead-or states may "enforce federal law only under the
supervision of the federal executive," among other designs.7 2 Additionally, some
statutes allow an agency like the EPA to bring an independent enforcement
action against a violator of a federal statute even if the state, using its delegated
authority under the statute, also has enforced the statute.73 However, courts have
limited this "overfiling" practice under res judicata principles.74 Additionally, in
some cases, local and state enforcement actions under federal statutes or waivers
from enforcement have been treated as revisions of states' approved delegated
programs and must receive federal approval.
b. Limited State Tools for Monitoring and Holding Federal
Principals to Task
Principal-agent challenges in the cooperative federalism context do not run
just from the federal government to the states; they are bidirectional. In some
cases, federal agencies that act as principals not only struggle to adequately
monitor subfederal entities and ensure that they are complying with minimal
federal requirements-they choose not to monitor at all. And when state agents
wish to regulate more aggressively to address problems that they
disproportionately shoulder (such as air pollution from cars in California's Los
Angeles region), the principal sometimes impedes their mission.
States acting within cooperative federalism regimes-as well as individuals
working from a grassroots level-have some, albeit limited, options for
monitoring and influencing the behavior of their federal principals if they believe
that these principals are not generally upholding their duties within a delegated
governance regime. They may participate in citizen suits against federal agencies
71. Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and the New
Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 87, 111-114 (2016).
72. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 65, at 474.
73. Lisa Dittman, Comment, Overfiling: Policy Arguments in Support of the Gorilla in
the Closet, 48 UCLA L. REV. 375, 377 (2000).
74. Id. at 378.
75. See infra note 110.
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76
and petition for an agency to initiate rulemaking under a federal statute.
Citizen-suit provisions enlist "citizens" broadly construed (including states and
local governments) as "private attorneys general" and allow suits against federal
agencies for failing to perform nondiscretionary duties under statutes.
However, these suits face numerous limitations, including the types of federal or
state agency actions or inaction that may be challenged.78 Alternative litigation
strategies include local governments and states arguing, via the Administrative
Procedure Act or other statutes, that their principals have reached too far in
controlling their agents under a cooperative federalism statute,7 9 or using these
types of suits to attempt to spur more federal action.80
Beyond the courts, states can and often do comment within agencies'
notice-and-comment rulemaking processes, arguing that the regulation is
inadequate to carry out a federal statute, fails to comply with that statute, or gives
too much or too little discretion to the states, among other comments,8' but the
agency need only respond to comments rather than substantively change the rule.
Additionally, as others have observed, federal agencies sometimes change
policies within consent decrees following a lawsuit, thus shutting states out of
the notice-and-comment opportunity.82 If a federal agency appears to be
underperforming, subfederal entities also may use disclosure and "shaming" and
information disclosure mechanisms, or directly lobby the federal government,83
in an effort to gain more control over their federal principals.
76. See, e.g., Letter from Veera Tyagi et al. to Gina McCarthy, EPA Adm'r (June 3,
2016), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/petition toepa ultra low nox
hd_trucks and engines.pdf [http://perma.cc/4EPN-HP8S] (showing numerous state and local
governments as petitioners for a rulemaking that would decrease emissions from heavy duty trucks).
77. See James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits,
10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003) (describing the types of citizen suits permitted, remedies allowed,
requirements for the types and timing of violations for which suits may be filed, and other citizen suit
requirements); Anuradha Sivaram, Why Citizen Suits Against States Would Ensure the Legitimacy of
Cooperative Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 447 (2013) ("Nearly every
major contemporary federal environmental statute contains a citizen suit provision."); Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (providing an example of state and local governments and nonprofit groups
successfully suing the EPA for its failure to justify its inaction in determining whether greenhouse gases
from vehicles endanger human health).
78. See May, supra note 77, for a discussion of these and other limitations.
79. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Michigan v. EPA,
213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy Governance
and U.S. Carbon Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 207-08 (2016) (describing twenty-seven states that
opposed the Clean Power Plan in the courts).
80. See, e.g., Wiseman & Osofsky, supra note 79, at 207-08 (describing the eighteen
states and several local governments that supported the Clean Power Plan in the courts).
81. Henry N. Butler & Nathaniel J. Harris, Sue, Settle, and Shut Out the States:
Destroying the Environmental Benefits ofCooperative Federalism, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 586
(2014) (noting policies "allowing states to participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking").
82. Id. at 582-584, 586.
83. See generally Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative
Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953 (2014) (describing states that form associations to discuss and vote on
various initiatives and other agreements and then lobby the federal government on the basis of these
agreements, although often without clarifying the extent to which all state members of the association




At the level of enforcement, as opposed to allegations of principals' general
failure to perform duties, states can request to work with the federal government
to enforce portions of statutes. Indeed, in the environmental context, states often
partner with the DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources Division to
prosecute environmental crimes and otherwise enforce the statutes that states
partially administer.84 But states can do little if the DOJ uses its enforcement
discretion to ignore certain violations or refuses to assist the states in certain
enforcement actions for budgetary, political, or other reasons. In these situations,
states are primarily limited to exercising their own authority to prosecute or
otherwise enforce statutory violations under the delegated governance regimes.
Here, citizens have more monitoring and oversight power in their ability to sue
both states and the federal government for a failure to enforce laws under certain
statutes .86
Identifying the basic building blocks that form the many different types of
delegated authority within cooperative federalism enables more nuanced
analysis of the principal-agent challenge in this context and methods of
addressing the challenge. It supports a better understanding of the pieces that can
be used to form the whole of a delegated regulatory regime, as well as the
benefits and dangers that any one piece might pose. For example, any
policymaker starting from scratch in designing delegated regulation for an area
of new risk would need to ask whether private and public actors should be
involved in regulating; which actors should write and promulgate standards,
monitor and enforce compliance; and the extent to which a federal agency, states,
and citizens should review and oversee other entities' regulatory work. Agencies
choosing to delegate should ask these same questions. Given certain ignoble
purposes of delegation, Congress or agencies may not wish to design an effective
regime, though they are required to do so under existing statutory commands for
87basic public protections.
84. Environmental Crimes Section, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (May 13, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/enrd/environmental-crimes-section [http://perma.cc/2SAH-RF4G] ("In order to
conserve resources and improve the efficiency of environmental enforcement efforts, [Environmental
Crimes Section] attorneys have often helped assemble environmental crimes task forces. Consisting of
federal, state, and local personnel, these task forces have successfully identified and handled many
environmental crimes cases.").
85. See, e.g., David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States,
the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1571-72 (1995) (noting that "essentially all the
modern major environmental laws provide uniform, minimum national standards with the states
'deputized,' to a greater or lesser degree, to do the permitting and enforcing for the federal government"
and that when states lack the resources to adequately enforce, the federal government typically has not
picked up the slack).
86. See, e.g., id. at 1618 ("Since 1972, the CWA has authorized citizens to act as private
attorneys general to enforce CWA violations that EPA or the states were unwilling or unable to
prosecute."); id at 1618-19 (documenting how citizen suits spurred federal enforcement action).
87. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2012) (requiring that the EPA "promulgate a national
primary drinking water regulation for a contaminant" if "the contaminant may have an adverse effect on
the health of persons," among other factors); id. § 300g-2 (directing states to have primary enforcement
authority for achieving these standards if the states meet minimum national requirements for their
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The following Part describes critical attributes that form delegated
governance regimes, providing a theoretical framework for assessing delegation
of federal responsibilities to subfederal entities within cooperative federalism
regimes and the need for ensuring accountability within these regimes-
accountability to existing statutes mandating basic regulatory protections, to the
public, and to all of the entities involved in implementing regulation.
II. The Regulatory Design of Delegation
The regulatory design of the many forms of delegation within cooperative
governance serves to accentuate or limit the principal-agent challenge that
unifies these forms-a challenge that can impede the effectiveness of regulatory
regimes. This calls for a theoretical framework for productive analysis. The
framework presented here has one common, relatively simple normative basis:
it is designed to enable scrutiny of all forms of delegated governance regimes to
determine the extent to which those regimes carry out the functions they are
required to under federal statutes and the extent to which principal-agent
challenges prevent these regimes from being fully effective. A vast scholarly
literature on regulatory failure observes that many other factors limit the
effectiveness of regulation, such as inadequate staffing and resources, capture
of the process by anti-regulatory interests,89 agency ossification under
-90increasingly stringent judicial review, and shifting political directives, among
many others. Indeed, Robert Glicksman argues that the original form of
cooperative federalism under the Clean Air Act has been problematically
converted to a system in which both states and the federal government are
hindered in their attempts to achieve environmental goals.9 1 But principal-agent
challenges also appear to be an important contributor to the problem-as
described in the case studies here-and seem particularly susceptible to
improvement through better regulatory design.
regulatory programs); id. § 7409 (requiring the EPA to publish air quality standards that "are requisite to
protect the public health" "with an adequate margin of safety"); id. § 7410 (requiring that states adopt
plans providing for "implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of these standards).
88. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and
Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1742-43 (2008) (noting that this problem and others have
contributed to regulatory failure).
89. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1595 (2007) (noting capture and other contributors to
regulatory failure).
90. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 539 (1997) (reasserting that court requirements
for extensive agency documentation are the primary causes of delayed agency action); Thomas 0.
McGarity, Some Thoughts On "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); see
also Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration and Deference:
The Transformation ofAuto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 170 (2017) (defining ossification
as the reality "that informal rulemaking has become so encumbered by procedural and analytic
requirements that it is no longer capable of delivering the results expected of it").




This normative baseline is simple in that I define effectiveness as whether
the regulatory regime is meeting existing federal statutory requirements.
Statutory requirements are of course the product of various political deals and
influence, and sometimes, they do not even represent a genuine belief that the
requirements will or can be achieved. But regardless of their imperfections, they
are the law. Where Congress has enacted federal requirements and designed
delegated governance regimes to meet these requirements-or agencies have
chosen to allow delegated governance-it is important to ask whether delegated
governance is in fact carrying out its purpose. This type of analysis can also be
predictive. Lessons of past failures or successes in terms of using delegated
governance to achieve existing statutory mandates can inform the formation of
new delegated governance regimes designed to implement newly-formed
standards.
This Part provides my proposed theoretical framework for understanding
the many forms of delegated agency governance that exist and analyzing their
effectiveness in avoiding principal-agent accountability problems that can
impede the effectiveness of regulation (as defined by whether the regulation
achieves statutory requirements). In constructing this framework, it uses case
studies from the environmental and energy fields to provide examples of the
framework's building blocks and to reveal the many ways in which they can be
combined to form a delegated risk governance regime.
A. Variations in Delegated Regulatory Regimes
When examining the panoply of ways in which federal agencies delegate
their regulatory duties, three basic attributes emerge. First, federal agencies
delegate some or all of their regulatory responsibilities. Second, agencies
delegate these responsibilities to different degrees, choosing to retain some
authority by operating in parallel with those entities-for example,
independently enforcing violations-or as a back-up, when the entities do not
properly perform their duties. Agencies also sometimes retain some control over
the regulatory project by engaging in case-by-case or relatively frequent review
of the individual actions of entities with delegated control, longer-term review
of the overall performance of those entities, or both. Finally, when delegating
their regulatory duties, agencies choose to delegate to one or more types of
entities, including local, state, or regional governments or private actors.
1. Type of Authority Delegated
Delegated governance regimes vary substantially in terms of the type of
authority delegated by the federal agency. In a typical regulatory regime,
responsibilities include: 1) drafting and promulgating standards or regulations,
as well as permits issued to regulated entities to ensure compliance with these
standards or regulations, 2) monitoring compliance with those regulations, and
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3) enforcing compliance through penalties or other means when regulations are
violated.
a. Drafting and Promulgating Regulations
Agencies often partially delegate the authority to draft and promulgate
regulations. For example, in the electric reliability example below, a federal
agency relies on a private organization to propose standards to prevent grid
92blackouts, but the agency itself must ultimately approve and formalize those
standards before they become enforceable.93 Additionally, even where federal
agencies have delegated regulation drafting and promulgation to other entities,
they sometimes assist with the drafting portion. For example, under the Clean
Air Act, the EPA relies on states to write regulations designed to achieve federal
air quality standards and issue permits to individual polluters that incorporate
those regulations. But the EPA provides guidance as to the types of technologies
that states should require through permits and regulations in order to control air
pollutant emissions.9 4
b. Monitoring Regulatory Compliance
Once regulations have been drafted and finalized, effective control of
various risks requires that the regulatory entity-sometimes with assistance from
regulatory targets (through self-reporting of violations) or concerned citizens-
monitor whether regulatory targets are complying with the regulation.
Monitoring takes many forms. For example, technologies on smokestacks can
measure the types and quantity of pollutants emitted from an industrial plant; this
information is then automatically transmitted to an agency and posted for public
review. In other cases, individual citizens or citizen groups file written
complaints with an agency, call a hotline, or, if permitted, file a citizen suit
alleging violations. Additionally, some citizens and local governments conduct
their own electronic monitoring by, for example, placing air pollution
measurement devices near oil and gas wells.95 Another very common yet
resource intensive form of monitoring involves agency inspectors physically
96visiting regulatory targets to identify potential violations.
92. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. RACTIBACTLAER Clearinghouse (RBLC), ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/rblc [http://perma.cc/8FH2-396V].
95. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, The Capacity of States To Govern Shale Gas






A final necessary element of regulation is enforcing corrections to a
violation once it has been identified. This, too, takes many forms. Sometimes
enforcement occurs simply by identifying a violation and requesting that the
regulatory target remedy it. For example, states, which are primarily responsible
for regulating environmental impacts at oil and gas sites, commonly send
inspectors to sites. These inspectors sometimes orally notify an oil and gas
company of a problem, and the company immediately fixes the problem; in these
cases, the violation is sometimes not even reported.97 At a more formal level of
enforcement, the inspector issues a notice of alleged violation; the oil and gas
company can dispute the allegation or remedy the problem. More formal
enforcement hearings often ensue, which result in an order or settlement
requiring the oil and gas company to take remedial actions by a certain date, and
in some cases, pay civil penalties and damages.98 Agencies take similar
approaches in other areas of the law. For example, when the EPA enforces
various federal environmental laws it often uses relatively informal means of
enforcement, such as letters, to attempt to pressure an entity to comply. In other
cases, the agency files a civil suit or immediately issues a monetary penalty or
other sanctions.99
Under cooperative federalism regimes, agencies independently or under
congressional directive choose to delegate some or most of these regulatory
tasks, as discussed in the following section.
2. Degree of Authority Delegated
Even when a federal agency delegates some or all of its three primary
regulatory responsibilities-drafting and promulgating regulations, monitoring
compliance with them, and enforcing compliance-the agency often retains
some degree of oversight in some or all of these areas through several avenues.
First, an agency sometimes retains parallel authority to act alongside the
delegated entity. For example, the agency might rely on another entity to write
and promulgate most regulations but retain the ability to independently
promulgate its own rules. Or the agency may independently enforce any
violation of a regulation promulgated by the delegated entity or the entity itself.
Second, an agency sometimes retains back-up authority, which allows it to write
regulations, conduct monitoring, or enforce violations only when the delegated
entity has failed in these duties. Finally, an agency might retain only review
authority, which means that it relies on the delegated entity to write and
97. E-mail from Leslie Savage, Chief Geologist, Tex. R.R. Comm'n, to author (Feb.
27, 2012, 9:01 AM) (on file with author).
98. See Wiseman, supra note 96, at 8383-84 (describing the enforcement process).
99. For a general discussion of agencies' use of these less formal enforcement means,
see Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DuKE L.J. 1841 (2011).
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promulgate regulations, monitor compliance, and enforce regulations, but may
review this entity's actions and require the entity to change course. This is the
case in the electricity reliability example below. A federal agency relies on a
private organization to write all standards, but the agency must review and
approve those standards and may direct the organization to re-submit and change
them. Some agencies, although not reviewing each individual regulation or
enforcement action, review the overall performance of an entity with delegated
authority and pressure it to improve, as shown by the oil and gas example below.
Review and monitoring of regulatory actions is also a two-way street;
agents must have ways to hold principals to tasks and ensure that principals are
complying with the federal statutes that they administer. There are several tools
available, including petitions for additional action, citizen suits, and suits using
the Administrative Procedure Act and similar statutes and arguing that agency
failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty or misinterpreted a federal statute in
refusing to take a particular action 0 0
3. Type of Entity With Delegated Control
An important third element of delegated governance regimes involves the
types of actors that receive delegated authority. These actors differ in terms of
the level at which they operate; at the lowest level, citizens or grassroots
organizations are sometimes involved in the regulatory effort through grassroots
monitoring, citizen suits, or other mechanisms, followed by local, state, or
regional governments. Private entities also play an important and sometimes
overlooked role. These include individual private actors and associations of
private actors. For example, states responsible for regulating oil and gas pollution
sometimes directly incorporate standards written by the American Petroleum
Institute into their regulations.'0 ' And in the electric reliability example below,
the private entity responsible for drafting regulations to be approved by a federal
agency relies heavily on the regulated electric utilities to assist in drafting.
While there is an extensive literature on industry self-governance102 and
agencies' contracting out duties to private entities, the literature has only more
recently begun to closely examine agencies' delegation of responsibilities to
private actors. For example, Karen Bradshaw Schulz and Dean Lueck examine
100. See supra Section I.B.3.b.
101. See, e.g., 16 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13 (2017) (requiring a specific type of casing
(lining) for oil and gas wells).
102. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI
and Performance Benchmarking, Precursors to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 286 (2001);
Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms'
Regulatory Compliance, 49 AM. J. POL. SC. 235 (2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental




federal agencies' reliance on landowners and nonprofit groups for much of the
habitat conservation required for endangered and threatened species.103
The following Section provides examples of the three primary building
blocks of delegated governance r gimes, demonstrating the impressive range of
variation in each of these three areas and how the blocks are combined in
different ways. In exploring these three areas, these case studies show the
principal-agent pathologies as well as positive opportunities for improving
delegated governance within delegated governance regimes.
B. Delegation Case Studies
When Congress directs a federal agency to delegate its responsibilities or
an agency decides to delegate, a wide menu of options is available. Although
Congress and agencies have both ignoble and practical reasons for delegating
(including, sometimes, a goal of obfuscating purposeful inaction), this Part
assumes that given the explicit requirements of existing federal statutes-which
agencies must comply with even if Congress did not in fact intend to achieve the
statutory purpose, or if the Executive Branch and Congress now disagree with
this purpose-the pathologies of delegation must be explored and addressed.
These case studies begin with the strongest examples of dysfunction caused by
a failure of federal principals-the agencies tasked with administering delegated
programs-to fulfill their role within the program and to adequately monitor and
enforce agents' behavior or support their needs with funding and other resources.
It then moves to cases that exhibit more success-albeit with lingering
challenges-in terms of both principals and agents carrying out their duties and
creating synergies in both directions, with principals sometimes pushing agents
toward improved regulation and, at other times, agents suggesting and carrying
out effective programs that they initiate.
The case studies also fall along a broad spectrum of delegation tools,
involving delegation of most or just some regulatory tasks; close or very loose
short- and long-term monitoring of agents and principals; retention of small or
large amounts of federal authority; and delegation to a limited number or
numerous types of entities.
In assessing the apparent successes and failures of these delegation
programs and the tools that they employ, I recognize that Congress or an agency
does not always form a delegated governance framework with the aim of
achieving statutory goals. Indeed, the political economy of delegation suggests
that there are many reasons for delegation that are somewhat unrelated to the
goal of meeting statutory obligations, and some of these reasons are more noble
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103. Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-
Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015) (exploring the agency-contracting literature and
examining the particular phenomenon).
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than others.104 In some cases, Congress creates a delegated governance regime
simply because it does not believe that imposing federal standards will otherwise
be politically acceptable to the states.0 5 At times, Congress also desires to shift
the resource-based burdens or political fall-out of regulation to subfederal
entities106 or believes that a regulatory task is so complex that the federal
government could not accomplish it alone absent a massive expansion of federal
funds and staff. 107 And Congress or agenciestos-or both-sometimes wish to
create an appearance of acting to address a public problem while masking the
fact that delegation makes it unlikely that effective regulation will occur.109 For
example, Congress or an agency can likely largely preserve the status quo if they
know that states will strongly resist implementing a federal requirement, yet
delegate anyway without providing many tools for monitoring or enforcing state
action." 0 Despite these and other nonstatutory reasons for delegation, I roughly
104. For general observations about the nefarious or ignoble purposes of delegation of
congressional power to agencies, see DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS:
A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 9 (1999),
who note political reasons for delegating, including the political fall-out (or "costs") of regulating at the
federal level; and Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 1744, who observe that "[c]ritics of delegation
argue that Congress delegates for nefarious purposes-to make transfers to interest groups and to avoid
responsibility for difficult political decisions."
105. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1192-93 (noting members of Congress's
observations regarding the need for state inclusion for the Clean Air Act to be feasible).
106. See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 104, at 2.
107. The Clean Air Act is an example of this. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1192-93
("The chief Senate sponsor, Senator Muskie ... contemplated that effective implementation of the Act
required state and local cooperation . . . . members of Congress were concerned with the practical
difficulties that would arise from implementing, enforcing, and funding the vast and complicated Clean
Air Act.").
108. Congress and agencies do not always share the same desires with respect to
carrying out the goals of a statute. Agency motives differ in part due to the fact that agency heads and
staff are agents of both the President and Congress. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 10, at 1454-55
(noting that sometimes an agency "casts aside congressional policy preferences not necessarily to pursue
its own agenda, but to pursue those of other principals," including the President). And a broad literature
explores the many reasons for agencies' action and inaction. DeShazo and Freeman divide agencies'
actions as agents into two categories: preference (such as choices to follow the directives of an agency
head more closely than those of Congress) and performance (such as laziness). Id. at 1454. For a
discussion of the various personal and professional motivations of agency officials and staff, see, for
example, id. at 1453-58; and Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification
Critique ofJudicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251 (2009).
109. SCHOENBROD, supra note 14, at 55 provides an example in which a statute that
delegated broad authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to issue marketing orders for fruits-orders
designed to create an "orderly" market and allow various growers to participate in the market while
keeping prices at an allegedly reasonable level for consumers-gave large grower associations undue
influence over the agency, led to higher prices, and helped to "insulate Congress and the White House
from political accountability for supporting laws that are harmful to the broad public interest." Schoenbrod
also notes that the statute delegating these marketing powers to the Agency was "framed in terms of
'attractive abstractions such as 'orderly' markets," and "privacy or leaving agricultural policy to the
experts . . . rather than in terms that might reveal legislative support of high prices to consumers." Id.
110. Of course, this approach can also backfire. States that wish to aggressively regulate
now have the leeway to do so. As the "iterative federalism," "uncooperative federalism," and "negotiated
federalism" literature recognizes, cooperative federalism can involve a back-and-forth between the federal
and state governments, with motivated, rebellious states sometimes pushing the federal government
toward more effective solutions even in the face of federal resistance. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen &
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assess success and failure through this metric because regulatory approaches are
legally supposed to hew to these goals-albeit with a fair degree of federal
agency discretion-and they provide a relatively direct means of assessing
effectiveness.
The following case studies focus on the environmental and energy fields
for several reasons. First, although numerous legal fields involve cooperative
federalism, cooperative federalism emerged in earnest with the enactment of the
environmental statutes in the 1970s."' Indeed, nearly all federal environmental
statutes have a substantial cooperative federalism component.112 Many accounts
of cooperative federalism or variations of cooperative federalism accordingly
rely at least in part on environmental examples,13 and I aim to import more
serious consideration of the design and operation of delegation into this
conversation.
Additionally, energy law involves a complex interplay of different levels
of government, in part because of the physical infrastructure it governs.114 There
is growing attention to cooperative federalism in this field."'5 States or local
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1275 (2009); Ann E. Carlson,
Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1108, 1128-37 (2009); Erin Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011). Alternatively, rebellious states also might prefer to
shirk, and, if not closely monitored by their agencies, face no consequences. The literature on delegation
from Congress to federal agencies frequently employs the concept of shirking. See, e.g., Matthew D.
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
243, 247 (1987). If Congress or agencies (or a President directing agencies) are determined to reduce
regulatory intervention, they sometimes preempt the "nonshirking" states, especially those that are
unusually motivated to act. See, e.g., Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption,
73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008) (denying California's request for regulating greenhouse gas emissions
from automobiles under the Clean Air Act). But see Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air
Act Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009) (showing the Obama administration's later grant of
the waiver request); see also Evan Halper, Trump's EPA Pick Casts Doubt on California's Power To
Regulate Auto Emissions, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-
epa-confirmation-20170118-story.html [http://perma.cc/5ZL9-UX6H] ("Oklahoma Atty. Gen. Scott
Pruitt said at a contentious confirmation hearing Wednesday that he cannot commit to keeping in place
the current version of a decades-old federal waiver that allows California to set emissions standards stricter
than elsewhere in the United States.").
111. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 669 (2001) ("Beginning most notably with the environmental statutes
enacted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the federal government began to rely on state agencies to
implement federal regulatory requirements.").
112. Adelman & Engel, supra note 7, at 1802; Weiser, supra note 111, at 742 ("Under
most of the federal pollution control statutes, states have the option of applying to EPA for authorization
to administer the permit programs that provide the principal means of applying emission standards or
other regulatory obligations, such as monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting, to individual regulated
entities.").
113. To name just a few examples, Christopher K. Bader, A Dynamic Defense of
Cooperative Federalism, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 161, 186-87 (2014), describes positive cooperative
principles within the environmental area; Jessica Bulman-Pozen, supra note 20, at 487, uses an example
from the Clean Air Act; and Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 110, at 1276-78, discuss the issue of
cooperative and uncooperative federalism under the Clean Air Act.
114. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD.
L. REV. 773, 787-90 (2013).
115. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path ofEnergy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV.
399, 452-455 (2016) (noting the Supreme Court's identification of certain energy regulation as involving
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governments largely regulate generation and the distribution wires that carry
electricity to homes and businesses, whereas FERC regulates generation for
wholesale sales in interstate commerce as well as electricity transmission;116
regional private actors and individual utilities are also involved in governing
transmission. 17
1. The Safe Drinking Water Act as Applied to Flint, Michigan
The regulation of the quality of drinking water provided to the public is an
unusually complex form of delegation within cooperative federalism, relying on
numerous layers of principals and agents. In fact, so many layers of delegation
are involved-with states and local governments acting as the primary
implementers of the Act alongside private consultants-that coordination and
monitoring failures appear to be rampant, as demonstrated by the Flint crisis.
The large amount of authority delegated to these entities by the principal-the
EPA-as well as the relatively small amount of authority retained by the
Agency-accentuate these challenges. In this case, numerous actors were
responsible for different tasks under the Act, with county and state health
agencies conducting monitoring of drinking water, the state environmental
agency implementing EPA requirements and enforcing these requirements, and
the EPA maintaining a back-up enforcement function.
The state environmental agency was the primary actor to blame for the
crisis-it failed to require a water treatment system clearly mandated by the
SDWA; misled the EPA to suggest that the system had been installed (thus
making EPA correction of failures by its agents slower and more difficult); and
resisted warnings from the EPA, citizens, academics, and other state officials
regarding water quality problems. But other actors, failed, too, showing the
cascading problems that can result when numerous tasks are delegated to
numerous entities. For example, city and county officials did not conduct the
proper tests that would have indicated water quality problems sooner.
a. Type of Authority Delegated
The EPA is responsible for writing federal standards for drinking water
quality under the SDWA. The Agency sets federal maximum contaminant level
goals (MCLG) for water pollutants,"8 which is the level of pollutant
concentration at which drinking water is deemed to have no adverse impacts on
cooperative federalism and noting possibilities for expanding cooperative federalism arrangements in his
field); Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, FederalPreemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1283,
1288, 1331 (2013) (similarly identifying possibilities for more reliance on cooperative federalism in the
energy law field).
116. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 114, at 805-06.
117. Id. at 804-805.




public health, including sensitive populations such as children, and is the level
that states must aim to achieve.119 States are not required to implement these
standards; they may choose to allow the EPA to directly regulate within their
territory. However, most states have opted to receive delegated authority,
meaning that they apply to the EPA to receive "primacy" under the Act.120 A
state with primacy becomes the entity that monitors and enforces compliance
with those regulations,121 and the state must submit a plan to the EPA showing
that it has adequate procedures and resources for monitoring and enforcing
compliance with the SDWA.122 States with primacy also must write certain
drinking water regulations that are at least as strict as federal regulations and
ensure compliance with federal water quality requirements.123 This initial
application for primacy is the closest review that the EPA does regarding the
adequacy of the states' (the agents') regulatory programs. It is a one-time review
without a specific sunset date, meaning that if the adequacy of state programs
weakens over time, the Agency sometimes fails to notice or take adequate action;
this occurred in the case of Flint, despite warnings from various citizens to the
EPA that the state lacked adequate money or resources to carry out basic SDWA
requirements.124
b. Degree of Authority Delegated
The EPA retains only moderate authority under the Act once it has granted
primacy to a state because it lacks parallel enforcement authority the ability to
enforce the Act alongside the state. This, along with the fact that the Agency
primarily only conducts a one-time review of state program adequacy, is another
central flaw in the design of this delegation scheme. Under the Act, the agency
only has limited back-up enforcement authority. If the public water system
violates "any applicable requirement" or fails to meet a deadline-such as a
deadline for installing required water treatment echnology-the EPA must
notify the state and issue a compliance order if the state fails to remedy the
noncompliance within thirty days.125
119. See 40 C.F.R. § 141.2 (2016) (defining MCLG as the "maximum level of a
contaminant in drinking water at which no known or anticipated adverse ffect on the health of persons
would occur, and which allows an adequate margin of safety").
120. MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL31243, SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT
(SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACTAND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 7 (2017) (noting that only the District
of Columbia and Wyoming lack primacy).
121. Understanding the Safe Drinking Water Act, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (June
2004), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/epa816f04030.pdf [http://perma.cc
/9JXW-RHHX].
122. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a) (2012).
123. Understanding the Safe Drinking Water Act, supra note 121.
124. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a).
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c. Types of Entities with Delegated Control
Once the EPA has conducted its one-time review of a particular state's
regulatory program and granted the state primacy, both private and public
entities are involved in implementing the SDWA, and, as shown by this case
study, numerous levels of government are involved. Local governments own and
operate many drinking water systems,126 the state regulates and monitors local
governments under federal and state standards, and the EPA writes the federal
standards and conducts back-up monitoring and enforcement. Local
governments also sometimes hire private consultants to conduct a number of
functions at their water plants and to advise them regarding required treatment
technologies under the regulations.127 The regulation of drinking water quality
in Flint, Michigan-in a state with primacy-shows how the state and other
entities are responsible for all three regulatory functions and failed to effectively
carry out these functions.
d. Program Results
As the task force report on the Flint crisis explains, the relevant regulation
involved in the Flint crisis was a federal water quality standard under the SDWA
called the Lead and Copper Rule.128 The MCLG for lead is zero milligrams of
lead per liter.129 To ensure that lead concentrations in drinking water are as close
to the MCLG as possible, the federal lead and copper rule requires drinking water
authorities to install certain types of systems that control the extent to which the
water will corrode lead and copper-based pipes when it flows through them. 130
For monitoring purposes the federal rule also requires, among other mandates,
drinking water suppliers to collect a specific number of samples of water quality
at the tap within system users' homes and businesses. 131
In the case of lead, the State of Michigan does not have regulations to
augment the federal ones. However, the state issues individual permits to public
water purveyors that contain specific requirements designed to ensure
compliance with the federal lead and copper standard. Further, the state is the
primary entity responsible for monitoring compliance with the federal lead and
copper rule (and the associated state permits), and enforcing compliance.132
Specifically, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ)
126. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
127. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
128. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 22.
129. Id.
130. 40 C.F.R. § 141.82 (2016); Flint Water Advisory Task Force Final Report, supra
note 4, at 22-23.
131. 40 C.F.R. § 141.86(c).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 300(g)(2) (2012) (describing how states with primacy have "primary"




provides water system "operator training and certification, operates certified
laboratories, and monitors and reports on public water system violations."33
When the City of Flint, which owns and operates the water system, wanted
to switch its water source to the Flint River, it applied to MDEQ for two permit
modifications.134 In granting these modifications, the MDEQ failed to ensure
compliance with the federal lead and copper rule in two key ways. It did not
require that Flint install a corrosion control system, and it failed to require
sampling of the quality of tap water in homes.135 The EPA's regional office-an
office that engages in certain inspection and enforcement activities and advises
parties regarding regulatory requirements 136-and ultimately the federal EPA, in
turn, failed to exercise their back-up enforcement mandate, in part because
MDEQ reported to the EPA that it had in fact required an "optimized corrosion
control program."137 But even after the Agency learned that the technology had
not been installed, it failed to act for months.138 Further, the EPA did not exercise
discretionary emergency authority triggered when a contaminant threatens
public health.139 Finally, complaints lodged prior to the Flint crisis had warned
the EPA that Michigan's drinking water quality program might be inadequate,
and that it was problematic that the state still had primacy for the program.140
This demonstrates inadequate monitoring of the overall performance of an entity
with delegated authority.
In addition to MDEQ, other state agencies also failed in their duties. The
state health agency did not properly monitor children's blood lead levels in Flint
and failed to adequately interpret data showing high blood lead levels.141 And
the Governor of Michigan is ultimately responsible for the decisions of both
MDEQ and the state health office.142 Despite evidence that the water was
contaminated (including direct evidence from the General Motors plant that it
could not use the new water supply because it was corrosive), the Governor's
office did not timely require these agencies to address their missteps.143 Further,
the Governor and his office participated in the initial decisions to switch the Flint
water supply, while the state Department of Treasury formally approved the
decision.4 4
133. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 26.
134. Id. at 27.
135. Id.
136. Cf David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement, 24 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2000) (discussing the inconsistent regional office application of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act).
137. Id. at 28.
138. Id. at 51.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 300i (2012); Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 49.
140. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 50.
141. Id. at 33.
142. Id. at 35.
143. Id. at 36.
144. Id.
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At the local level, beyond the City Council's participation in switching to
a corrosive water supply without installing a corrosion control system, the city
hired consulting engineers for its water plant that lacked "adequate expertise and
experience with river water treatment" and failed to question the state's decision
to not require corrosion treatment.145 Furthermore, although MDEQ was
responsible for enforcing the lead and copper rule, it was the city's responsibility
under the rule to install the corrosion treatment system, which it did not do.146
The city's failure to invest in updated pipes for distributing water also
contributed to the crisis.147 And the city, which was responsible for sampling tap
water under the lead and copper rule, failed to meet sampling requirements, thus
providing the EPA with flawed information.148 Finally, the county's health
department and the city did not timely notify the public of the dangers of the
water, and the department conducted inadequate sting of children's blood lead
levels.149 Of course, many of these deficiencies related to the major economic
crisis facing the city and county, demonstrating the challenges of implementing
requirements due to severe budgetary constraints and the need for the principal
to provide resources to assist agents who lack the resources to adequately
implement regulations.
The Flint example under the SDWA reveals numerous failures within a
delegated governance regime. No one failure appears to be the primary cause of
the problem, leading to a m6lange of lessons that cannot all be reasonably
ordered by priority. However, one particular flaw that could be highlighted above
others is the EPA's delegation of numerous tasks to the state and local entity-
and maintenance of that delegation-despite warnings of the lack of resources
that these entities had to fulfill their duties under the SDWA.
Here, the EPA had the authority to (and did) write regulations governing
the problems encountered in Flint, but it did not properly assert its mandatory
back-up enforcement authority. Further, improper monitoring of compliance by
the state agency despite numerous warnings of likely violations from citizens
and academic experts meant that noncompliance was not detected in time to
avert the disaster. The EPA also failed to respond to general concerns regarding
the State of Michigan's overall performance in implementing its SDWA
responsibilities, thus falling short in its monitoring responsibilities. And finally,
the involvement of multiple levels of delegation in this case-including the local
water provider's delegation of certain matters to private engineers without proper
training in compliance requirements-might have exacerbated the problem. The
number of entities involved in regulation might have created confusion as to who
was responsible for what, and many entities might have assumed that other
145. Id. at 43-44.
146. Id. at 45.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 51.




responsible parties were solving any problems that arose, demonstrating a sort
of regulatory commons-type problem.15 0 Indeed, the final Flint report diagnosing
the regulatory failures in this case points to the EPA's excessive deferral of issues
to the state in this matter. The report notes that except for sending "strident e-
mails" to the state and issuing one interim report, the Agency failed to timely act
to bring the state and City of Flint into compliance with the SDWA.' 5 '
In many respects, Flint involved failures by individuals, not agencies,
highlighting how the principal-agent challenge operates not only in the federal-
state context but also within governmental units.152 The need for each
responsible government to adequately monitor and enforce the behavior of
individual agents is striking within this example. Although the principal-agent
problem within agencies is beyond the scope of this Article, regulatory design
tools to address this challenge, such as improving training and incentives for
regulatory staff, enhancing compliance monitoring techniques that do not rely
on human inspection and reporting (and thus avoid certain human error), and
increasing permitting fees to adequately fund agencies and staff hiring are
important considerations in this context.
2. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) provides another
example of challenges within a cooperative federalism delegated governance
regime. In this case, the EPA delegated all three types of regulatory tasks
described above to one entity (the states), rather than the many different entities
with regulatory responsibilities. The EPA appears to have retained too little
authority in this area, and, as discussed below, a recent lawsuit forced the EPA
to reclaim some this authority by updating its environmental regulations.
RCRA covers the generation, transport, and disposal of both hazardous and
nonhazardous wastes on land, with the goal of preventing disposal operations
from polluting land and water.153 The Act's delegated governance r gime came
about due to a specific congressional decision to let the EPA decide whether or
not to regulate most oil and gas wastes under the hazardous waste portion of the
Act or to leave this regulation mostly to the states.154 Thus, unlike the SDWA,
150. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6-7, 7-12 (2003) (defining the regulatory commons as an area in
which multiple governments have some control, but not over the entire problem; government officials
may fail to notice gaps; and government officials might lack adequate incentives to address their portion
of the regulatory problem due to free riding and their lack of control over all externalities, among other
challenges).
151. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 51.
152. See supra note 28.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2012).
154. See Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration,
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,446 (July 6, 1988) (describing the
congressional directive that led to the EPA's decision).
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where Congress formed a cooperative federalism regime, Congress gave the
EPA the leeway to decide. The EPA's subsequent decision to leave most control
to the states-one made despite Agency recognition of gaps in state
regulation5 5 -created a regime involving delegation of nearly all federal
responsibilities, with the EPA only maintaining the ability to take back
regulatory control under RCRA if it so chooses. (Recently, unsuccessful
petitions have been filed to try to trigger the EPA to reinstitute RCRA
responsibility. 156)
RCRA appears to be an example of both Congress and agencies desiring to
delegate authority through a cooperative federalism regime-perhaps in part to
satisfy powerful interest groups. After Congress enacted the original act, heavy
lobbying from the oil and gas industry led Congress to direct the EPA to study
whether the hazardous waste portion of RCRA, which contains the most
stringent limitations on generation, transport, and disposal of wastes, should
apply to the disposal of oil and gas wastes and to make a final decision after this
study.5 7 The EPA subsequently concluded that although some gaps in state
regulation remained, it would be very expensive for oil and gas companies to
comply with RCRA. 1s It accordingly left most responsibility for regulating the
disposal of wastes from oil and gas drilling and hydraulic fracturing to states;
although, it retained marginal authority by indicating that it would continue to
work with states to improve their regulations.159 The EPA has since remained
involved in a public-private group that reviews the environmental adequacy of
state regulations in this area and makes nonmandatory recommendations to
improve these regulations, with only mixed success.160
a. Type of Authority Delegated
Under the SDWA, states and local governments are responsible for
implementing federal standards. The same is true for states that have primacy
under RCRA, which regulates the disposal of both hazardous and nonhazardous
wastes; local governments, however, are not generally involved. In the case of
oil and gas development, the EPA determined in 1988 that most wastes resulting
from the production of oil and gas-even wastes with hazardous
characteristics-should not be defined as hazardous for the purposes of
RCRA.161 This decision delegated to states the independent authority to draft and
155. See id. at 25,446-47.
156. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
157. 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,446 (describing Congress's directive).
158. Id. at 25,450, 25,455 (noting the economic impacts if the hazardous waste portion
of RCRA were to apply to oil and gas waste but acknowledging that "because of certain regulatory gaps
[in state regulation], damages have occurred even where wastes re managed in compliance with existing
requirements").
159. Id.
160. See infra note 166.




promulgate regulations controlling the disposal of hazardous oil and gas wastes
and to monitor and enforce compliance with these regulations.
b. Degree of Authority Delegated
When the EPA made this delegation decision, it did not wholly abdicate its
regulatory, monitoring, and enforcement responsibilities. The Agency observed
that some management and disposal of hazardous oil and gas wastes under state
regulations had caused contamination and public health problems, and that
certain gaps in state regulation remained. The EPA therefore developed a three-
pronged strategy for reviewing states' regulatory decisions. First, the Agency
indicated that it already was using other parts of RCRA such as the portion that
covers nonhazardous wastes (including oil and gas wastes generally)-the Clean
Water Act, and the SDWA to fill gaps in federal regulation of oil and gas
wastes.162 For example, under the SDWA, the EPA regulates the underground
injection of oil and gas wastes, and the EPA indicated that its efforts to strengthen
this regulatory program to address certain gaps were already underway.163
Second, the EPA planned to work "with the Congress to develop any additional
statutory authority that may be required."164 And finally, the Agency indicated
that it would "encourage" changes to state regulation of oil and gas waste by
working with the states.165
The most relevant of these approaches from the delegation perspective was
the Agency's decision to work with states through a voluntary program that
would nudge states toward improving their regulations. While this decision did
not retain any formal parallel regulatory authority for the EPA, it allowed the
Agency to be at least marginally involved in states' drafting and promulgation
of regulation and monitoring and enforcement policies. Specifically, the agency
funded and participated in a nonprofit organization (STRONGER)166 that made
recommendations to states regarding the adequacy of the content of their
regulations as well as their compliance and enforcement programs. The most
recent STRONGER guidelines occupy more than one hundred pages and include
detailed recommendations for state regulation of oil and gas waste disposal.
Some of the guidelines are quite specific with respect to substantive regulations,
while others provide more general criteria. Considering state programs
regulating the siting of oil and gas waste management facilities as an example,
the guidelines provide that facilities should not be "located in a flowing or
162. 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,446-47.
163. Id. at 25,447.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Non-Voting Members, ST. REV. OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS.,
http://www.strongerinc.org/our-team/non-voting-members [http://perma.cc/2FF6-68X3] (showing EPA
participation on the STRONGER board); Support, ST. REV. OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS.,
http://www.strongerinc.org/support [http://perma.cc/8ESE-NJFA] (showing funding sources, including
the EPA).
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intermittent stream"167 (a seemingly obvious priority to many, perhaps). More
generally, the guidelines indicate that "[w]here necessary to protect human
health," new oil and gas waste management facilities should not be located near
"existing residences, schools, hospitals, or commercial buildings" and that states
should consider providing minimum required setback distances between the
waste facilities and these types of buildings.168
With respect to state monitoring of regulated entities and enforcing
compliance with their oil and gas waste regulations, the guidelines provide that
states should monitor compliance by requiring waste management facilities to
receive an individual permit or other type of approval.169 They also recommend
that if states issue individual permits, the permits "should be issued for fixed
terms," so that states can periodically review and potentially revise them. 170
Additionally, the guidelines suggest that states should have means of conducting
"comprehensive investigations" of waste management and investigating specific
complaints or other information about potential violations as well as the
"capability to conduct regular inspections" of facilities in addition to other
compliance recommendations. 171
Finally, regarding enforcement of state regulations, the guidelines
recommend mechanisms such as the ability to issue notices indicating violations
by regulated entities and establishing a schedule that the entities must follow for
remedying the violation.172 They also provide that states should be able to
immediately restrain a waste activity that "is causing or may cause damage to
public health or the environment," in addition to the use of other enforcement
tools, such as enabling courts to address violations.173
Initially, the EPA was directly involved in writing these provisions; it
worked with a group of states to write and publish guidelines in 1989 and
1990.174 Thus, while the Agency did not retain parallel authority to write
regulations or monitor and enforce compliance with them, it encouraged states
to regulate in certain ways by publishing the guidelines. The Agency is now less
involved through this role because it is not a coauthor of the guidelines. Rather,
one EPA representative is a nonvoting member of STRONGER,175 which writes
and updates the guidelines. However, the Agency has continued to periodically
maintain an active role in reviewing the adequacy of states' oil and gas waste
regulation. In 2014 the agency prepared a report reviewing state regulations and
167. 2015 Guidelines, ST. REV. OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REG. 40 (2015),
http://www.strongerinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-STRONGER-Guidelines.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7CDH-F9U2].
168. Id. at 40-41.
169. Id. at 21.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 22.
172. Id. at 23.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 5.




identifying gaps (although not weighing in on whether these gaps were
problematic).176 Still, the EPA has not chosen to adopt parallel regulatory
authority in this area.
c. Types of Entities with Delegated Control
In delegating most of its regulatory responsibilities to the states, and less
formally to STRONGER, the EPA has ceded authority to both public and private
entities. The states are responsible for regulating, yet they are reviewed (if they
so choose) by STRONGER a nonprofit entity that includes both industry
representatives and state and federal regulators. Industry representatives can
provide important perspectives on the technologies and practices that might best
control waste. And the inclusion of representatives from environmental groups
on the board might help offset potential industry pressure to make guidelines less
stringent.
d. Program Results
The success of the regulation of oil and gas wastes under RCRA appears to
be mixed at best. STRONGER claims substantial success, noting that with
respect to its guidelines specific to hydraulic fracturing, the states reviewed by
STRONGER implemented sixty-six percent of its recommendations to improve
their regulatory programs, and partially implemented an additional twenty-five
percent of recommendations. And many of the recommendations resulted in
important regulatory changes. For example, one critical means of ensuring that
hydraulically fractured wells do not allow oil, natural gas, or fracturing
chemicals to seep into underground or surface water is to ensure that the wells
are adequately lined with steel pipes called "casing" cemented into the well
before they are fractured, and that the cement and casing will not crack or
otherwise be compromised due to the pressure placed on the well by fracturing.
In response to a recommendation by STRONGER, Louisiana issued emergency
statewide rules requiring, among other things, that hydraulically fractured wells
include the "casing necessary to withstand . . . stresses" and that they "be
cemented in a manner which will anchor and support the casing." 179
176. Memorandum from Patrick M. Kelly, Envtl. Eng'r, Office of Res. Conservation &
Recovery, to File (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/state_
summaries_040114.pdf [http://perma.cc/N6U6-EF34] [hereinafter Kelly Memorandum].
177. Who We Are, ST. REV. OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., http://www.strongerinc.org
/about-us/who-we-are [http://perma.cc/2M8M-GE56].
178. A Report and Summary of Outcomes from 2010-2012 Hydraulic Fracturing State
Reviews, ST. REV. OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS. 4 (2016), http://www.strongerinc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/A-Report-and-Summary-of-Outcomes-from-2010-2012-Hydraulic-Fracturing-
State-Reviews.pdf [http://perma.cc/3H4G-MVSR] [hereinafter STRONGER Report].
179. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 43, § XIX.433(G)(2)(a) (2017).
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But a closer look at the numbers reveals a more nuanced story. Of the
small number of states reviewed, implementation varies substantially, leaving
certain populations more vulnerable than others. For example, while Colorado
fully implemented all STONGER recommendations, Oklahoma fully
implemented only two of five recommendations. so In response to one
STRONGER recommendation that the state's oil and gas agency "develop a
more stable source of funding" so that it could have adequate staffing and
equipment to run a regulatory compliance program, the Agency simply indicated
that it had obtained approval to get some funding from a state petroleum tax but
"more work needs to be pursued in this area."'8 ' While agencies of course are at
the mercy of legislative budgets, the responses that he state "is heavily
dependent on revenues generated by the oil and gas agency" and that more work
is required are not assurances that the Agency will in fact actively and
aggressively seek means of improving its resources.182 Additionally,
Oklahoma's oil and gas regulatory agency indicated that it would not specially
train its staff, as recommended by STRONGER, due to resource limitations.183
Although inadequate inspection and enforcement resources, including
training resources, plague many oil and gas states, it is also possible that
Oklahoma's decision to not follow some of the STRONGER recommendations
stems from the fact that the oil and gas industry is a major component of the
state's economy,184 and the state tends to resist calls to modify its regulations or
address environmental impacts caused by the industry. For example, despite
mounting scientific evidence that underground disposal wells for liquid oil and
gas wastes were causing numerous earthquakes in the state, including relatively
large earthquakes, the state repeatedly denied a causal link before finally
conceding that practices needed to change.iss
The STRONGER recommendations themselves-even when implemented
by states-might not be enough to control the risks of oil and gas waste disposal.
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), which unsuccessfully
petitioned the EPA to revisit the Agency's exemption of oil and gas wastes from
RCRA hazardous waste regulation, pointed to state agency reports and other
sources showing toxic oil and gas wastes, some of which contaminated
180. STRONGER Report, supra note 178, at 3.
181. Id. at 29-30.
182. Id. at 30.
183. Id.
184. RegionTrack, Economic Assessment of Oil & Gas Tax Policy in Oklahoma, ST.
CHAMBER OKLA. 18 (Dec. 2013), http://www.regiontrack.com/www/wp-content/uploads/OK-Oil-Gas-
Tax-Policy-Dec-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/GV6E-HGHP] (estimating that "[o]il and gas firms account
for only 
3 .2 % of all business establishments but hire 5% of wage and salary workers, produce 10% of
state GDP, and generate 1 3 .5 % of total earnings statewide").
185. See Mike Soraghan, Okla. Agency Linked Quakes to Oil in 2010, But Kept Mum
Amid Industry Pressure, ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060014342
[http://perma.cc/XF7P-XSB5] (describing the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Survey's rejection of scientists
Katie Keranen's findings regarding links between oil and gas wastewater disposal activity and earthquakes




environmental resources,186 and noted substantial gaps in state regulations.8 7
For example, NRDC observed that some states limit the minimum distance
between application of oil and gas waste to the surface of land (a method allowed
in many states), but the siting distances vary, and some states have no siting
regulations for land application of waste.8 8 Other publications similarly note
gaps in regulation.189 The EPA's own review of states' oil and gas waste
regulatory programs reports that states "typically" do not have regulations that
require groundwater monitoring around oil and gas solid waste facilities, among
other missing regulations at the state level, although the report does not pass
judgment based on this observation.190
Beyond the regulatory gaps, there is evidence of pollution from inadequate
control of waste disposal. Surface spills at oil and gas sites are not uncommon,191
and some have resulted in pollution of environmental resources.192 Thus, on the
one hand, RCRA delegation, under which the EPA originally transferred most
authority to states with the explicit recognition that some gaps remained in state
regulation, might have achieved its partially ignoble purpose of avoiding
potentially important regulation due to its costs to industry and the political
pressures against more stringent regulation. On the other hand, the use of
STRONGER shows a creative mechanism of involving industry, environmental
groups, and federal and state agencies in an effort to review the adequacy of
agents' regulatory programs, although these are largely one-time reviews with
limited follow-up.
186. Letter from Nat. Res. Def. Council to Lisa Jackson, EPA Adm'r 8, 12 (Sept. 8,
2010), http://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/ene_10091301a.pdf [http://perma.cc/KX8B-XFQ7]
[hereinafter Nat. Res. Def. Council Letter].
187. Id. at 24.
188. Id.
189. Michael Burger, Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
150 (2012) (arguing that here is a case for federal regulation of hydraulic fracturing and noting the
impacts on communities); Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L.
REV. 729 (2013) (documenting regulation variation); Nathan Richardson et al., Resources for the Future,
The State ofState Shale Gas Regulation: Maps ofState Regulations, CTR. ENERGY ECON. & POL'Y (2013),
http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegsStateMaps_0.pdf [http://perma.cc
/D9WU-AMSX] (showing variations in a variety of state requirements, including some states that simply
do not regulate in areas that other states do).
190. Kelly Memorandum, supra note 176, at 4.
191. See Lauren A. Patterson et al., Unconventional Oil and Gas Spills: Risks,
Mitigation Policies, and State Reporting Requirements, 51 ENVTL. SC. & TECH. 2563, 2567 (2017).
(finding that between two and sixteen percent of active unconventional oil and gas wells in four states
experienced spills during all stages of the life cycle); Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas: Impacts from
the Hydraulic Fracturing Water Cycle on Drinking Water Resources in the United States, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY 5-48 (2016), http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid=332990
[http://perma.cc/N3HL-S8TZ] (reporting a spill rate of 0.4 to 12.2 percent for the hydraulic fracturing
process).
192. For an examination of some of the risks and actual pollution events, see Wiseman,
supra note 189.
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3. Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act-one of the most complex and frequently-discussed
examples of cooperative federalism-does not involve as many layers of
delegation as the SDWA. However, both state and local governments are
centrally involved in its implementation. As with the SDWA, numerous
regulatory tasks, including drafting and enacting, monitoring, and enforcing
regulations-or at least portions of these tasks-are delegated. Still, the EPA
retains more substantial authority to independently enforce violations of the Act,
and private entities are less centrally involved in the regulatory scheme.
Despite the EPA's retention of authority, in some cases the EPA has not
been able to correct states' failures to implement federal requirements-due
largely to the political difficulty associated with its efforts to impose direct
federal regulations on states, particularly in areas that involve regulatory fields
traditionally dominated by state and local governments, such as land use. But the
EPA has also effectively used its relatively strong retained authority to use soft
tools-backed up by credible threats-to motivate state action, as discussed in
an example below where Colorado implemented innovative controls at oil and
gas sites partially in response to EPA pressure.
a. Type of Authority Delegated
The Clean Air Act is one example of a federal agency delegating portions
of all three regulatory functions to states but retaining strong parallel and back-
up authority. As required by the statute's complex cooperative federalism
scheme, the EPA directs the states to promulgate their own regulations to achieve
federal air quality standards and issue permits to ensure compliance with these
regulations; the states must do this through state implementations plans (SIPs).193
States also must monitor compliance and enforce these permits. When the EPA
reviews SIPs, states must specifically demonstrate that they have the resources
necessary to implement their regulations and proper penalties for enforcing
noncompliance.
b. Degree of Authority Delegated
Although the EPA has delegated all three regulatory functions under the
Clean Air Act, it has not fully delegated control to the states. It retains substantial
parallel and back-up authority. With respect to back-up authority in this area, if
states write an inadequate SIP or fail to write one within federal deadlines, or if
their plan becomes outdated and weak, the EPA may "recall" the SIP and issue
its own, directly imposing federal requirements on actors previously regulated




by the states.194 Although the EPA has only rarely exercised this authority,
largely for political reasons,'95 it is a strong back-up authority with respect to the
ability of the Agency to issue its own regulations rather than relying on the state
to do so.
As directed by Congress, the EPA also retains parallel authority to write
and promulgate certain regulations. For example, although states must achieve
federal standards through regulations and permits issued under their SIPs as air
quality issues have continued or new problems have emerged, Congress has
directed the EPA to write specific standards, which states must then incorporate
into their SIPs. One of the major federal standards applies to new sources of
pollution. As numerous new industrial sources were constructed-thus
increasing air pollution-Congress required the EPA to write technology-based
standards to control pollution from these sources.196 States must then implement
these standards by drafting and promulgating specific regulations under their
SIPs and including technology-based requirements in the individual permits that
they issue to polluters. Here, too, the federal government retains some control in
the states' drafting of regulations. The government defines which technologies
states may choose to include in their regulations and permits through a
clearinghouse that identifies the pollution control equipment and processes that
polluters have successfully tested or used at their facilities. 197
As introduced above, states are additionally responsible for indicating
within their SIPs how they will monitor and enforce compliance with SIPs and
demonstrating that they will have adequate resources to do so.198 But in another
example of parallel authority, the EPA has the ability to independently monitor
regulated entities' compliance with both state and federal requirements under the
Act. For instance, the Agency may inspect the premises of regulated entities and
require reporting and emissions measurement.199 To implement federal controls
on certain emissions, the Agency also requires some polluters to continuously
monitor emissions from their smokestacks;200 digital readings from these
monitors flow to a centralized EPA database that reports these emissions.
The Agency also retains substantial enforcement authority under the Act.
Some of this enforcement authority is independent, parallel authority to enforce
a violation, meaning that either the state or the EPA may require compliance with
194. Id. § 7410(c) (giving the EPA the authority to write and issue a federal
implementation plan).
195. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Missing Milestones: A Critical Look at the Clean Air
Act's VOC Emissions Reduction Program in Nonattainment Areas, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 41 (1999) (noting
that federal implementation plans are rarely used).
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-79.
197. RACTIBACTLAER Clearinghouse (RBLC), supra note 94.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(B), (C).
199. See id § 7414 (granting the EPA the authority to require reporting and to inspect
regulated entities in addition to other monitoring authority under the Clean Air Act).
200. 40 C.F.R. pt. 75 (2017).
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a Clean Air Act regulation, permit, or SIP.201 For example, the EPA may issue
orders requiring regulated entities to comply with SIPs or permits. 202 Other
authority is back-up authority; the EPA must first find that the state has
consistently failed to enforce its SIPs or permits under the SIP before conducting
its own enforcement-including, for example, issuing penalties and taking civil
actions for violations of the SIP.203 The EPA also must first give the state the
opportunity to correct its failed enforcement program before the EPA uses this
enforcement authority.
c. Types of Entities with Delegated Control
Beyond the states, citizens and citizen groups play an important role in
triggering the drafting and promulgation of regulations, monitoring compliance,
and enforcing compliance. Through a citizen-suit provision that partially
204delegates to citizens the role of monitoring and enforcement, citizens may and
often do file lawsuits alleging that the EPA has failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty, such as writing a rule under the Clean Air Act. They also
may sue alleging that the EPA and states have failed to address an entity's
violation of the Clean Air Act. Citizens may not, however, sue the states for
failing to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the Act. Some argue that this is
a major flaw in the Act because it requires the EPA to monitor the entities
primarily responsible for implementing the Act.205
d. Program Results
The Clean Air Act has been hugely successful in reducing the concentration
of numerous pollutants in the air,206 although some persistent pollution problems
continue to elude regulators-particularly pollution from cars. Further, the EPA
continuously battles with certain states over their SIPs, and its use of federal
implementation plans (FIPs) is very rare, in part due to political difficulties
associated with past attempts. For example, as documented by John Dwyer, after
Congress attempted to require all states to include transportation and land use
controls in their SIPs to address air pollution (from cars traveling long-distances
from poorly designed suburbs, for example), the EPA's FIPs failed in many
circuit courts.207 The Agency eventually stopped efending certain aspects of the
FIPs on appeal, and Congress repealed the requirement that states include land
201. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1).
202. Id.
203. Id. § 7413(a)(2).
204. Id. § 7604.
205. See Sivaram, supra note 77.
206. See Environmental National Emissions Totals, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/nationaltieri _caps.xlsx
[http://perma.cc/FWR3-6P25] (showing substantial reductions in air pollutants over time).




use elements in their SIPs. After Congress required states to include inspection
and maintenance programs in their SIPs or face EPA sanctions and several states
failed to implement proper programs, the EPA refused to issue these sanctions
for a long period of time. Additionally, it reached political compromises with
208states like California rather than issuing sanctions. More recently, the
Agency's efforts to prevent states from approving activities that send harmful
pollutants across state borders resulted in court battles spanning more than a
decade.209
In other cases, the EPA has more actively reviewed and enforced state SIP
failures. Under the Clean Air Act, if states through their SIPs have not achieved
compliance with federal air quality standards, EPA may step in and directly
regulate.210 This allows the EPA to monitor whether states' SIPs are working.
When the EPA determines that they are not, it often gives states a grace period
during which they can attempt to improve their regulatory programs. If the state
still has failed to meet the standards, the EPA designates the region of the state
that is not in compliance as a "nonattainment" area, which triggers additional,
stricter federal regulations that apply to sources of air pollution. For example, as
oil production expanded near Denver, oil companies stored more of a substance
called "condensate" near wells. Condensate is a very light, more volatile form of
oil that, when stored in open tanks or tanks with leaky valves, sends various
pollutants into the air. Condensate, along with traffic in the Denver area, was one
of the primary contributors to this area's smog problem caused by ground-level
211ozone.
Due to the persistent smog problems in this area, the EPA designated it as
nonattainment. However, it delayed formal designation, giving the state
additional time to attempt to reduce smog.212 The Agency signed a compact with
the state and other entities responsible for maintaining air quality under
213Colorado's SIP (including local governments). Through this "early action
208. Id. at 1212-16.
209. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (upholding the
EPA's Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which replaced the Clean Air Interstate Rule); North Carolina v.
EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the EPA's Clean Air Interstate Rule designed to reduce
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides that crossed state borders, but later keeping the rule in place until the
EPA developed a new rule in North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); Michigan v. EPA,
213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding most aspects of the EPA's rule regarding numerous tate SIPs
and addressing emissions of nitrogen oxide that cross state borders).
210. However, the EPA must write a federal implementation plan if the state "is not
implementing a previously approved SIP." James D. Braddock & Alec C. Zacaroli, Meeting Ambient Air
Standards: Development of the State Implementation Plans, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 49, 62
(Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli eds., 4th ed. 2016). Violating national air quality standards could
indicate inadequate implementation, in which case a federal plan is technically required.
211. Dale Wells, Condensate Tank Emissions 2 (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.epa.gov/ttnchiel/conference/ei20/session6/dwells.pdf [http://perma.cc/7QR7-73P9].
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compact," these entities agreed to take certain actions to attempt to reduce
214ground-level ozone emissions. These actions failed, but the EPA granted
215several extensions for the state to attempt to come into compliance. In 2007,
when attainment of federal air quality standards still had not been achieved in
this area, the EPA refused to further extend Colorado's options, and it officially
216labeled the Denver area as being in nonattainment.
This is an example of a relatively active role of the Agency in monitoring
the adequacy of a delegated entity's regulatory program. In this case EPA
continued to review whether Colorado's updated regulatory efforts to reduce
smog were working. When these efforts failed, the agency stepped in and
triggered additional federal requirements.
In summary, the Clean Air Act the first major cooperative federalism
statute, which served as a model for many others to come-represents a complex
combination of the primary delegation building blocks. In administering the Act,
EPA has had both successes in terms of monitoring and working proactively with
states to achieve important regulatory outcomes and failures in terms of its
inability to rein in states like Texas, which have repeatedly resisted
implementation of the Act. While some "rebelliousness" under the Act has
allowed states to take aggressive measures to address localized, problematic
conditions like smog caused by automobiles in Southern California, similar
resistance has resulted in foot-dragging, leading to some parts of the country-
including many portions of Texas, one of the leading opponents of implementing
217the Act-to remain out of compliance with federal standards.
4. Energy Policy Act
FERC's regulation of electricity reliability under the Energy Policy Act
offers a final example of substantial reliance on a private organization to carry
out regulatory responsibilities-but also shows an unusual degree of federal
oversight authority. Maintaining a reliable electricity supply involves ensuring
that power plants instantaneously provide adequate amounts of electricity when
customers demand it and ensure that the power grid is not compromised by
physical problems, such as falling trees or vandalism, or cyber issues. Prior to
2005, FERC had essentially no regulatory role in this area. This was not a matter




217. See Current Nonattainment Counties for All Criteria Pollutants, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY (June 20, 2017), http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/ancl.html






despite arguably having congressional authorization to do so. Instead, the
Agency had left most responsibility to a private organization called the North
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). This council, comprised of
utilities that own and operate power plans and transmission lines, was a self-
regulatory entity. These industry members wrote guidelines, monitored
compliance, and self-enforced the guidelines. This later changed, as described
below.
FERC's reliance on a private entity to draft standards and later enforce
them, combined with its close review of these standards and NERC's individual
enforcement actions, appears to be a relatively strong model of reliance on
industry to develop and implement highly technical standards, subject to strong
governmental oversight. As discussed below, however, some have argued that
this oversight is excessive, reducing in some cases NERC's effectiveness by
causing confusion and unpredictability, such as by using different standards to
review NERC's actions.
a. Type of Authority Delegated
The lack of public involvement in regulating electricity reliability changed
in 2003 when a massive electricity blackout cascaded through the eastern
electricity grid, leaving millions of people in the dark.219 Following this blackout,
Congress through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed FERC-the federal
agency primarily responsible for regulating energy-to select an electric
reliability organization that would govern grid reliability.220 NERC was the only
organization that applied for this job, and FERC approved it as the U.S. electric
reliability organization. Pursuant to congressional directives, FERC still
maintains a primary role in promulgating but not enforcing regulations. NERC
must propose electricity reliability standard-the rules that require electric
utilities and owners and operators of electricity transmission lines to take actions
22 1like regularly trimming trees that could fall on power lines and identifying all
218. The Federal Power Act granted to FERC's predecessor the authority to regulate
"transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce," and most of the transmission grid is considered
to involve interstate commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
219. Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada
74, U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE (Apr. 2004), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod
/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4ZS-Z2HC].
220. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1211, 119 Stat. 594, 941
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)-(c) (2012)) (directing FERC to select an electric reliability organization
and receive proposals for reliability standards from this organization).
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vulnerable computer controls of plants and lines that could be subject to cyber-
222attack or technical failures. FERC then reviews and approves those standards.
FERC also relies on NERC to monitor compliance and enforce reliability
223
standards, although FERC has parallel enforcement authority. Additionally,
FERC's retained authority to oversee the entity to which it has delegated power
is unusually detailed, as discussed in the following section. Unlike the Clean Air
Act, where the federal agency reviews SIPs but must give states a reasonable
amount of latitude in their choice of regulations, FERC maintains broad
discretion to reject the standards.
b. Degree of Authority Delegated
Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress mandates that FERC
directly monitor NERC, and FERC therefore maintains an important regulatory
role. As introduced above, the Act requires FERC to review and approve, reject,
224or approve as modified all electric reliability standards proposed by NERC.
This forces the Agency to continuously review the content of the regulations
written by the entity holding delegated authority. Although FERC may not
independently draft standards, it may require NERC to write standards
addressing specific issues and remains ultimately responsible for promulgating
the standards. Additionally, Congress requires the agency to receive notice of all
of NERC's enforcement actions, and each action may be reviewed and approved
225or rejected by FERC.
c. Entities with Delegated Authority
Given the unusual degree of direct delegation to a private entity here, this
substantial oversight is likely for good reason. NERC is a corporation, not a
government agency, and utility owners and operators are very active in
226developing NERC-proposed standards through its committees. NERC also
227follows a process approved by the American National Standards Institute, a
222. CIP-002-5.1a, Cyber Security - BES Cyber System Categorization, NORTH AM.
ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/ layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=CIP-
002-5.1 a&title=Cyber%20Security%20%E2%80%94%20BES%20Cyber%20System%20Categorization
&jurisdiction=null [http://perma.cc/6P9H-B7AP] (providing the standard requiring identification of all
vulnerable computerized evices).
223. Energy Policy Act § 1211 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o(e)(3), (4)).
224. See supra note 35.
225. Energy Policy Act § 1211 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o(e)(1)-(2)) (requiring the
electric reliability organization to file "notice and the record of the [enforcement] proceeding" with FERC
and providing that "[s]uch penalty shall be subject to review by the Commission, on its own motion or
upon application by the user, owner or operator that is the subject of the penalty").
226. See Standing Committees and Other, NORTH AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP.,
http://www.nerc.com/comm/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/M7ZZ-Y7JB].
227. See Memorandum from NERC Legal Standards Departments to NERC Standards




nonprofit organization that develops standards-approval processes u ed by
industry associations and other nonprofits writing their own norms and
guidelines.228 The participation of industry actors in developing reliability
standards is critical because they are most familiar with the technical aspects of
the grid that ensure reliability. Without adequate supervision, however, it also
could result in an undue amount of private influence.
FERC's oversight authority is also important because NERC is not the only
entity with delegated FERC authority. NERC delegates much of its work for
drafting reliability standards and enforcing them to smaller groups called
Regional Entities (REs). REs include all segments of the utility industry-power
plant owners and operators, transmission line owners and operators, electricity
end users, and others.229 REs, in turn, are responsible for carrying out the
requirements of reliability standards and ensuring that the grid is in fact reliable;
they often delegate the tasks of implementing reliability standards through
contracts with utilities, which are responsible for operating the transmission grid
230and power plants that are subject to reliability standards.
d. Program Results
As FERC has reviewed NERC's and REs' standard-development processes
and enforcement actions, it has used its strong oversight authority, rather than
merely rubber stamping the proposals. It often has required numerous changes
to the standards (albeit, in some cases, changes that NERC anticipated that it
would have to make).231 The Commission has also ordered NERC to submit
revised standards that FERC had requested and NERC failed to timely
232provide. In the compliance and enforcement context, FERC has sometimes
imposed additional penalties for a utility's violation of a standard233 or indicated
that notices and settlements or standards are inadequately detailed to support
234accurate penalty calculation. Several observers have noted that these and other
235




/9EJ8-Q55P] (describing NERC processes that meet or exceed ANSI requirements and those that differ).
228. See, e.g., Bill Bush, ANSI Reaccredits API's Standards Program, API (Oct. 6,
2011), http://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/news/2011/10/06/ansi-reaccredits-apis-standards-
program [http://perma.cc/Z4TA-793T].
229. Key Players, NORTH AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com
/AboutNERC/keyplayers/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/9TG7-ZZMR].
230. Florida Blackout, 129 FERC ¶ 61,016 (2009) (showing that Florida Power and
Light was acting as the Reliability Coordinator for the RE under a contract with the RE).
231. John S. Moot, When Should the FERC Defer to the NERC?, 31 ENERGY L.J. 317,
321 (2010).
232. See, e.g., Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk Power Systems, 130 FERC
¶61,218 (2010).
233. Scott Grover, FERC Guidance Order Shows Inter-Agency Tension, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2009, at 61, 63 (describing FERC Guidance Order No. 672).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 63; Moot, supra note 231, at 323.
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the perception of FERC as inflexible and inadequately deferential to NERC's
236
expertise.
It is unclear whether FERC's relatively strong exertion of its authority has
resulted in improved electricity reliability. The electric grid remains highly
vulnerable to cyber-attacks, as shown by recent incursions by China and other
countries, and large storms, as demonstrated by Hurricane Sandy. But substantial
progress toward grid liability also has been made.
Together, these four case studies demonstrate substantial variance among
delegated governance regimes in terms of the type of authority delegated, the
extent to which the delegating agency oversees others' actions, and the types of
entities receiving delegated authority. The following Part draws lessons from
these case studies regarding the benefits and pitfalls to be considered within each
building block of a delegated governance regime in order to constrain principal-
agent challenges and enhance opportunities for effective regulation under
delegated governance.
III.Lessons from Delegated Governance Regimes
Legislators considering requiring an agency to delegate certain
responsibilities and agencies choosing to delegate based on existing enabling
authority would both benefit from an understanding of the basic components of
delegated regimes and the aspects of regulatory design that appear to enhance or
limit principal-agent challenges. This would allow them to separately consider,
for example, whether the exercise of drafting versus promulgating regulation or
enforcing and monitoring compliance would best be primarily conducted by the
federal agency or an entity with delegated authority or through shared authority.
But to effectively piece together the various building blocks of the regime, these
entities need guidance as to the likely opportunities and drawbacks posed by the
choices within each category. Much more scholarly and practical work will be
required to flesh out the costs and benefits of different approaches under each
building block. This Part analyzes some of the key normative considerations that
can drive this effort.
The strongest lesson from the case studies is the importance of designing
delegated governance r gimes for adequate monitoring of principals' and agents'
behavior, as well as the correction of that behavior when it deviates from a
federal statute's directives or purposes. I describe both the monitoring of
behavior and efforts to substantively change that behavior as "oversight." In the
case of Flint, the EPA should have responded to warnings that Michigan had not
237properly exercised its primacy under the statute long before the Flint disaster.
Additionally, it should have exercised its ability to withdraw primacy under the
program and to conduct back-up enforcement. Even if the EPA had been more
236. Moot, supra note 231, at 323-24.




diligent, its limitation to back-up enforcement instead of parallel enforcement
also might have been problematic. This demonstrates how agencies that have
delegated numerous functions might need to preserve the ability to work
alongside the state when it comes to enforcing regulatory requirements.
This Part will discuss how oversight of both principals and agents within
delegated governance can be conducted by numerous entities, including citizens
and independent "review" agencies. The Flint problem finally came to light due
to the diligence of individuals at many levels, including county and state health
and environmental officials, a federal EPA official, citizens, and academics.238
But citizens, local governments, and states also need ways to correct a failure of
the principal to carry out its duties, thus highlighting the importance of
adequately expansive citizen suit provisions in addition to other mechanisms
discussed here.
Beyond the importance of adequate oversight tools, those designing
regimes should consider both the benefits and limitations of assigning different
regulatory tasks to numerous levels of government, including considering the
comparative advantages of these entities, ensuring that an agency plays a
coordinating function among the different responsible entities, and
implementing safeguards that address the inevitable human error within
agencies-error that can be amplified the more agencies and staff are involved.
In Flint, government officials from the city, county, state, and federal EPAs were
all centrally involved in protecting the water supply, and despite warnings from
officials at all of these levels, months of foot-dragging occurred before action
was taken. This represents, among other problems, a failure of coordination.
Relatedly, designers of delegated governance regimes should more closely
consider the comparative advantages of different levels of government and
different types of "governing" entities-including private parties-when
delegating different types of regulatory functions. For example, private parties
might best be involved in regulation drafting in a regulatory regime involving
highly technical standards, as shown by the FERC case study. There are
numerous other design features to consider if-as I argue should be done-
legislatures and agencies take the mechanics of delegation more seriously. This
Part therefore proposes initial considerations rather than providing a
comprehensive toolbox for design.
A. Improving the Quality, Quantity, and Duration of Oversight
The Flint crisis, in particular, sheds light on the critical role that federal
agencies play in overseeing entities to which they have delegated regulatory
tasks, as well as the equal importance of citizens, state agents, and other entities
238. See Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 20 (noting warnings about
high lead level from citizens, professors, state environmental and health office officials, individuals
representing the federal EPA, and county officials, among others).
281
Yale Journal on Regulation
overseeing federal principals. Particularly in an area that is central to public
health delegation without adequate oversight is extremely dangerous. The crisis
also demonstrates the importance of designing and carrying out an oversight
regime that carefully considers how well oversight is conducted, what types of
oversight occur, and how often officials and other entities undertake oversight
efforts, such as review of the effectiveness of delegated governance programs
and proposals for substantive modifications to those programs.
1. Ensuring High-Quality Oversight: Enhanced Use of Technology,
Citizen Monitoring, and Independent Review Agencies
With respect to the quality of oversight within delegated governance
regimes, officials at all levels need an adequate amount of accurate information
in order to properly assess the outcomes of a delegated regulatory program and
whether principals or agents are achieving those outcomes. Wendy Wagner has
noted the challenges of governing without adequate data generally-not just in
239the delegated governance context-and how difficult it is to obtain this data.
In the case of Flint, the informational errors were relatively basic: they tended to
involve human error rather than complex tasks of measuring and assessing risks.
State and federal officials lacked adequate and accurate data from tap water tests
because the Flint plant operators had not conducted the proper amount or type of
tap water testing.240 And EPA officials initially lacked proper data about
potential water problems because state and local officials told them that a
corrosion control system had been installed, which was not true.241 The crisis
was only fully revealed after academics, citizens, and officials from multiple
levels of government repeatedly sent complaints and testing data to state and
federal agencies identifying problems with the water.242
The SDWA and the lead and copper rule promulgated under it have testing
requirements designed to help avoid this type of situation-requirements that the
local water authority and state agency simply did not follow.243 But when a
federal regulation contains requirements both for substantive outcomes, such as
installing proper water treatment technologies and maintaining certain water
quality, as well as testing for those outcomes, federal officials need to properly
review whether the entity with delegated authority is meeting both of these
239. Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure ofEnvironmental Law To
Provide the Information Needed To Protect Public Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619
(2005).
240. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 51 (noting that the EPA was
"hampered by poor information derived from Flint's flawed water quality sampling").
241. Id. at 50 (observing that he EPA did not become aware of the lack of a corrosion
control treatment system until a citizen brought it to the Agency's attention and that it took two months
for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality to concede that it was not implementing this
treatment).
242. Id. at 20-21, 50.




requirements. Due to limited capacity at the federal level (and, in some cases,
federal resistance to regulatory involvement generally), this task can be difficult,
but there are several solutions.
Following the lead of Daniel Esty, who highlighted the enormous potential
244of technology to revolutionize environmental law, many scholars have noted
245
the opportunity for monitoring technologies to improve compliance. Indeed,
for a challenge like water contaminated by the pipes leading into homes and
businesses, "smart" digital technologies installed on even a few hundred taps-
which could automatically send information to the water supplier-would have
quickly revealed the lead contamination. Some water systems already deploy
similar digital monitors to transfer information about water leaks and other
system inefficiencies, and similar devices could reasonably be deployed for
water contamination. Indeed, using technology rather than people to monitor
large-scale problems like contamination at thousands of individual water taps
would save agencies at all levels of government a great deal of time and money.
Where monitoring technologies are not broadly deployed-or even where
they are-citizens also play a critical role, as a growing literature on "bucket
246brigades" documents. Individuals with "boots on the ground" can conduct the
large-scale monitoring that a few agency inspectors cannot realistically perform.
While there are substantial challenges associated with educating these citizen
enforcers so that they collect and report accurate and uniform data, regulatory
officials and academics can help to provide the training and resources necessary.
This is also costly. As shown in the RCRA case study, Oklahoma indicated that
247
it lacks the funding even to properly train its inspectors, although it might have
other motivations for less-than-optimal evels of training and inspection. But an
up-front investment in training and the technologies that citizens need in order
to conduct effective monitoring could have a high payoff and save money over
time by replacing certain official inspections with citizen efforts. Further, as
shown by the Flint crisis, academics that already have the expertise needed for
effective monitoring could be more regularly consulted and supported in order
to assist the oversight effort.248
A final, important tool in improving monitoring of both federal principals
and their agents is the expanded use of review agencies, the role of which is
244. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 115 (2005).
245. See, e.g., Markell & Glicksman, supra note 23 (describing the potential of
electronic monitoring technologies).
246. See, e.g., Dara O'Rourke & Gregg P. Macey, Community Environmental Policing:
Assessing New Strategies ofPublic Participation in Environmental Regulation, 22 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 383 (2003) (describing citizens' involvement in monitoring air quality at hydraulically fractured
oil and gas sites).
247. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
248. Cf Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 25-26 ("[A] team of
scientists from multiple Michigan universities is expected to test Flint drinking water in 2016."). For a
discussion of relatively effective bucket brigades that helped monitor air quality near oil and gas sites, see
O'Rourke & Macey, supra note 246.
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solely to analyze the adequacy of regulation, risks that arise under a regulatory
scheme, and potential needed improvements of regulation. These agencies are
249independent agencies, not primarily comprised of political appointees, and are
somewhat immune to the dramatic political shifts that occur over time. Their role
in monitoring the adequacy of regulatory programs is key. They typically review
federal agency actions,250 but some also review the state and local role in
addressing risks. A useful model comes from the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), the sole mission of which is to review the cause of accidents such
as rail collisions and aviation incidents and to recommend needed regulatory
changes.251 The NTSB recommends federal, state, and local changes needed in
252order to improve transportation safety. Independent agencies formed in other
regulatory areas with missions similar to the NTSB could and should play a much
broader role in monitoring risks under regulatory programs and suggesting
needed changes both to regulations and to the principals and agents tasked with
implementing them.
2. Conducting Frequent and Long-Term, Micro- and Macro-Scale
Oversight
Beyond demonstrating the need to ensure that monitoring provides
accurate, high-quality data needed for oversight, all of the case studies in Part I
highlight the importance of conducting oversight of certain individual actions
carried out by the principal and the agents with delegated authority (even if only
a sampling of these actions), as well as long-term assessment of program results.
Additionally, they show the need to conduct oversight at different geographic
scales-for example, at individual oil and gas sites or water taps what could be
described as the "micro" scale-in addition to more centralized or "macro"
locations. With respect to the frequency of review, in the case of the Clean Air
Act, if federal officials do not regularly, repeatedly review states' SIP
programs-and whether states are meeting federal air quality standards-they
will miss changes that cause increased air pollution, such as booming oil and gas
253development. The EPA helps to avoid this problem through a network of
249. The "review" agencies that I discuss here do not refer to all independent agencies,
but rather those independent agencies like the National Transportation Safety Board that are primarily
tasked with informational projects such as investigating the causes of accidents and recommending
improved policies rather than promulgating regulations.
250. About the NTSB, NAT'L TRANsP. SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/about
/Pages/about ntsb.aspx [http://perma.cc/AP5L-ZBF2].
251. For extensive discussion of the role of the NTSB and its contribution to recently
improved rail safety regulations in the context of transporting oil, see Wiseman, supra note 27.
252. See, e.g., Safety Recommendation H-1 7-015, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD,
http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/H-17-015.pdf [http://perma.cc/8VUN-CP43] (making
recommendation to the Maryland State Department of Education to change certain school bus driver
requirements).
253. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 211, at 2 (noting the growth of oil and gas development




digital air quality monitors managed by local governments, tribes, states, and the
federal government around the country254 and by requiring continuous
255monitoring of certain emissions from smokestacks. However, there is growing
256recognition of micro-pockets of polluted air at the spatial level, such as near
257oil and gas sites, which would not be detected by existing stationary monitors.
And sometimes federal agencies are not motivated to act on this monitoring data
or lack the funding or political will to conduct monitoring. In some cases, the
federal EPA has addressed pollution at these smaller levels. For example, in
Colorado-where booming oil and gas development contributed to previously-
underestimated air quality nonattainment problems-federal EPA staff "used a
vehicle fitted with measuring devices to remotely measure and calculate
emissions" from fifty-two individual tanks at oil and gas sites.258 Additionally,
citizens, local governments, and academics have helped to catch these types of
"micro" problems and bring them to the attention of the EPA. For example,
Garfield County, Colorado, conducts continuous monitoring of air quality near
25 9certain oil and gas sites, and recent studies have highlighted certain air quality
260
problems near oil and gas sites around the United States.
With respect to the importance of longer-term oversight of program
performance, the RCRA and Energy Policy Act case studies provide examples
of the potential problems that can result when an agency tends to focus on just
one type of review: either short-term, frequent review of actions by the delegated
entity or longer-term, overall performance review. The STRONGER reports on
state oil and gas regulatory programs and recommendations for improvements in
those programs have been somewhat effective.26 But STRONGER reviews are
conducted on a voluntary basis, do not cover many of the states responsible for
254. Air Quality System, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/aqs
[http://perma.cc/QQD5-XZGX] ("The Air Quality System (AQS) contains ambient air pollution data
collected by EPA, state, local, and tribal air pollution control agencies from over thousands of monitors
. . . . AQS data is used to assess air quality, assist in Attainment/NonAttainment designations,
evaluate State Implementation Plans for NonAttainment Areas, perform modeling for permit review
analysis, and other air quality management functions.").
255. 40 C.F.R. pt. 75 (2017).
256. Rafael Borge et al., Assessment ofMicroscale Spatio-Temporal Variation ofAir
Pollution at an Urban Hotpot in Madrid (Spain) Through an Extensive Field Campaign, 140
ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T 432 (2016) (noting strong spatial and temporal variations in air quality).
257. See Hilary M. Goldberg et al., It's a Nuisance: The Future ofFracking Litigation
in the Wake of Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., 33 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2015) (noting numerous private
lawsuits against energy companies alleging that hydraulic fracturing has led to air pollution).
258. Wells, supra note 211, at 1-2, 10.
259. AirResource Specialists, Garfield County 2013 Air Quality Monitoring Report,
GARFIELD COUNTY PUB. HEALTH DEP'T, at v (June 30, 2014), http://www.garfield-county.com/air-
quality/documents/airquality/GARCO MonitoringReport 2013_Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/F37A-E47E]
(noting that air quality monitoring is conducted near oil and gas sites).
260. O'Rourke & Macey, supra note 246 (describing the results of air quality
monitoring by citizen "bucket brigades" near oil and gas sites); Oil and Gas Emission Inventory, Eagle
Ford Shale: Technical Report, ALAMO AREA COUNCIL GOv'T (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.aacog.com
/DocumentCenter/View/19069 [http://perma.cc/T643-5DRK].
261. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
285
Yale Journal on Regulation
regulating oil and gas wastes, and have only been completed for six states that
262
regulate hydraulic fracturing for oil and gas. However, STRONGER has
reviewed twenty-four states' general oil and gas waste management regulations,
263
as opposed to hydraulic fracturing-specific regulations. The 2014 EPA report
also highlights overall performance and deficiencies of the states in regulating
264oil and gas wastes. But neither the EPA nor STRONGER regularly or
periodically reviews whether states are enforcing violations of their regulations;
instead, STRONGER reviews whether states have adequate inspection resources
or staff for conducting inspections. Nor do these reports focus on problems at
individual well sites or even within smaller portions of states, which could result
in an uneven distribution of environmental impacts.
Although more frequent review, as well as additional micro-level review,
would likely improve state oil and gas regulatory programs, FERC's experience
under the Energy Policy Act shows the challenges of conducting this type of
review. Reviewing each regulation and enforcement action with a fine-toothed
comb can result in tensions between the delegating agency and the delegatee,
and less cooperation in terms of improving regulation and compliance. Indeed,
as FERC conducted frequent reviews it also changed its position on the standard
that it would follow in reviewing reliability standards several times, thus creating
265further frustration. Federal gencies must strive to strike a balance in this area.
They should not abandon the effort to regularly monitor the delegated entity, but
they should periodically communicate with that entity regarding its concerns
about the burdens of this monitoring and attempt to identify ways to reduce those
burdens, such as providing predictable standards of review and working to
reduce the delegated entity's costs of reporting to the federal agency.
The Energy Policy Act example also shows how focusing resources on
individualized, frequent review without overall review of performance can be
dangerous, resulting in risks such as blackouts. Luckily, another agency in this
case helps to pick up the slack, and FERC does conduct some periodic
evaluations. FERC provides seasonal reports on reliability,266 and the
Department of Energy has written several larger reliability assessments.267
262. STRONGER eport, supra note 178, at 2.
263. State Reviews, ST. REV. OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REG.,
http://www.strongerinc.org/state-reviews [http://perma.cc/R865-UHXJ].
264. Kelly Memorandum, supra note 176.
265. See Moot, supra note 231, at 322 (describing FERC's changing its standard of
reviewing NERC actions and resulting objections).
266. Reports & Analyses, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov
/market-oversight/reports-analyses/reports-analyses.asp [http://perma.cc/J2RU-7AUW] (showing FERC
seasonal reliability reports).
267. Cf Office of Elec. Delivery & Energy Reliability, Transmission Reliability
Program Overview, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia
/OEFS TRP web.pdf [http://perma.cc/YC8C-VBQP] (describing the Department of Energy's grid
reliability activities, including developing a tool that allows NERC to "monitor compliance" with




In the case of Flint, the EPA's, state's, and local governments'
individualized and longer-term oversight, as well as micro- versus macro-scale
oversight, was inadequate. The EPA failed to properly review and remedy the
one-time decision by the plant to switch to river water without installing a
corrosion control system, as did the many other entities responsible for this
system. Further, the EPA failed to respond to warnings that Michigan's overall
26 8SDWA program performance was lacking and that the state had not invested
the resources necessary to operate an effective regulatory program.
Review of both agents' and principals' performance under delegated
governance regimes i potentially the most important yet most underappreciated
aspect of design in the delegation context. The fact that many states operate
under a long-term grant of regulatory primacy by the EPA, checked primarily
only by periodic citizen suits that frequently result in inaction, shows that
periodic review of performance, as well as longer-term lookbacks, is largely
lacking in these regimes.
3. Expanding Tools for Changing Substantive Behavior in Response to
Monitoring
One of the most substantial challenges for entities within delegated
governance regimes i calling responsible actors to task when monitoring shows
that there is a problem. In terms of oversight from the federal to subfederal level,
the tendency in delegation is for the agency to conduct close, up-front review of
the delegated entity (described by Emily Hammond and David Markell as the
"gatekeeper" function in primacy269) but to then lag in later reviews (described
by Hammond and Markell as the ex post monitoring responsibility270). For
example, under the Clean Air Act, SDWA, and RCRA, the agency conducts a
thorough initial review to determine whether the state has adequate regulations
and regulatory resources to receive primacy, or whether an activity regulated by
the state should be exempted from the federal regulation altogether. But later,
follow-up reviews tend to be lacking and sporadic despite federal agencies'
271ability to revoke states' primacy for a variety of reasons.
Having sunset dates for primacy or mandatory periodic review periods
could help to solve this problem. Statutes creating a cooperative federalism
regime could mandate that a federal agency creating primacy for a state (primary
authority to implement a federal regulatory regime) only allow this primacy to
continue for a certain number of years; these statutes could also allow for agency
renewal of primacy only if the state demonstrated that it continued to uphold its
responsibilities under the statute. Softer options than sunsetting are also
268. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
269. Hammond & Markell, supra note 67, at 331.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 330-32.
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available; the statute could merely that require the agency review specific aspects
of states' programs every few years without requiring withdrawal of primacy.
But as recent political changes demonstrate, federal agencies might lack the
resources or political will to uphold their duties under federal acts or to
adequately oversee entities exercising delegated federal power. Here, the
statutorily-enabled abilities of citizens, local governments, and states to
encourage or force federal agency action are important tools. As introduced in
Part II, citizens, including states and local governments, can petition agencies
and argue that they have violated a nondiscretionary duty by, for example, failing
272to reconsider a previous decision to abdicate federal responsibility. The
agency need not substantively change its behavior based on this petition, but it
273at least must adequately respond. For example, the Natural Resources Defense
Council and other environmental groups petitioned the EPA arguing that
conditions had changed so dramatically since its 1988 determination of state
control that the EPA should now regulate these wastes under the hazardous waste
274portion of RCRA. Although this was unsuccessful, it did cause the EPA to
275
review the adequacy of state programs. Additionally, another environmental
citizen suit alleging that the EPA had failed to update other RCRA regulations
that apply to oil and gas wastes, thus violating a nondiscretionary duty, was
successful and resulted in a consent decree under which the EPA agreed to issue
new rules for oil and gas wastes by 2019.276
When agencies decline to take action on the basis of a petition, citizen suits
277can and have sometimes forced substantial changes in agency behavior. For
example, these types of suits have forced the EPA to issue some of the most
stringent air quality regulations under the Clean Air Act.278 There are, however,
272. Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits To Enforce
Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 353, 353 (2004) (noting that most federal environmental
laws contain citizen suit provisions that "authorize private citizens to sue persons alleged to be in violation
of their statutory or regulatory obligations or to sue government agencies alleged to have failed to perform
nondiscretionary duties").
273. See, e.g., Diana R. H. Winters, Intractable Delay and the Need To Amend the
Petition Provisions of the FDCA, 90 IND. L.J. 1047, 1052-53 (2015) (noting citizens' ability under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act to petition for various actions with respect to rules prohibiting certain
substances in food and the Food and Drug Administration's duty to respond albeit a duty that includes
much discretion).
274. Nat. Res. Def. Council Letter, supra note 186.
275. ADAM VANN ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R43152, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES, CONG. RES. SERV. 11 (2014) (noting that the EPA had not yet acted on the
petition); Kelly Memorandum, supra note 176 (reviewing state regulation of oil and gas wastes).
276. Consent Decree, Envtl. Integrity Project v. McCarthy, 319 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. Dec.
28, 2016) (No. 1:16-CV-00842-JDB), ECF No. 33.
277. For an example of a successful citizen suit filed by public interest groups, local
governments, and states following the denial of a rulemaking petition, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 511-12 (2007).
278. Glicksman, supra note 272, at 358-59 (describing the suit that forced the creation
of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program under the Clean Air Act-a program that requires
new, major sources of air pollution that are located in areas that have attained federal air quality standards




substantial limitations to the petition and citizen-suit process. In some cases,
citizens may not petition or sue states to force them to carry out nondiscretionary
279duties. Particularly where numerous types of regulatory tasks have been
delegated, citizens also should have the ability to make similar petitions
regarding the failure of subfederal agents to perform duties under delegated
programs.
In terms of holding principals to task, Congress may need to specify a
standard of review that is more likely to force agencies at all levels, including
the federal level, to perform nondiscretionary duties. Despite some early citizen
suits that resulted in dramatic changes such as stringent Clean Air Act
regulations, citizen suits have not recently had as much success, in part due to
narrow judicial interpretations and a general reluctance of courts to force
agencies' hands.280 This is in part due to the narrow wording of citizen-suit
provisions themselves, which tend to only allow suits for nondiscretionary duties
and a failure to enforce individual violations of a statute after an agency has
received notice of this problematic failure to enforce.281 Statutes, particularly
those designed for extensive delegation, should likely have wording that
provides a clear, nondiscretionary duty for an agency to review the adequacy of
delegated program performance within specified time frames. Alternatively, the
citizen suit provision could be more broadly worded to include "failure of the
agency to reasonably oversee and correct delegated entities' performance" as a
cause of action.
In light of political gridlock and Congress's general sluggishness in
revising statutes, it is unlikely that additional statutory causes of action for citizen
suits will emerge anytime soon. Other suggestions for nudging federal agencies
toward action where they are failing to comply with a statute could potentially
be more promising. For example, Michael Livermore and Richard Revesz have
proposed that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) should
review agencies' refusal to act in response to citizen petitions for rulemaking.
Under this proposal, agencies would be required to "justify their disposition of
petitions to OIRA using some form of cost-benefit reasoning."283
B. Enhancing the Use ofDisaggregated Regulatory Authority
Involving numerous levels of government in a regulatory project, including
through a delegated governance approach, can be effective. Federalism scholars
have noted that this framework can provide the types of checks and balances
279. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
280. May, supra note 77, at 28.
281. See id. at 1-2.
282. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1379-90 (2013).
283. Id. at 1390.
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seen at the federal level with the tripartite governance system. If one entity
fails in its regulatory duties, another might notice this failure and pick up the
slack. Further, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi have observed that overlapping
authority over a particular regulatory issue-whether at the same or multiple
governance levels-allows different entities to bring different skills and
285resources to the regulatory table.
The case studies from Part II show that assigning different types and
degrees of regulatory duties to different levels of government can have benefits
while also producing substantial coordination and regulatory commons-type
problems that no single entity has the authority or the motivation to address.286
These problems do not only involve a failure of agencies; they also poignantly
demonstrate the threat of failures by individuals within multiple levels of
government-failures that can perhaps be lost in the maze of responsibility
created by many different entities performing many different duties. In the case
of Flint, individuals from the federal EPA, state environmental and health
agencies, county health agency, and city utilities department all expressed
concerns about water quality and even had conference calls and in-person
meetings about these concerns long before anyone took action,287 in large part
due to failures by other key individuals. This coordination was sporadic and
inadequate, as noted by the final task force investigating the causes of the Flint
crisis.288 But the crisis shows that even with some coordination, massive
regulatory failures are possible.
This Part focuses on three considerations in the design of delegated
governance regimes that could help to ensure that the principal-agent
relationship created by this regime enhances rather than hinders effective
governance and prevents regulatory failures. First, it is important to assess the
comparative advantages of different levels of government and the particular tools
they bring to the table. Second, assigning an existing agency or creating a new
entity to play the role of a coordinating "umbrella" organization seems important
when several regulatory roles have been delegated to a substantial degree. And
finally, although engaging several levels of government in a regulatory project
can help provide a form of insurance if there is failure at any one level,
government agencies are still subject to human error, as poignantly shown by
Flint. Implementing safeguards against the failure of individuals is important,
284. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 20, at 459 (observing that cooperative federalism,
not just full delegation of authority to states, can enhance separation of powers protections).
285. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 21, at 1150-51. But see id. (also noting challenges).
286. Buzbee, supra note 9.
287. See, e.g., Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, app. V, at 7 (noting that
Genesee County Health Department representatives held a conference call with city water quality staff
regarding "county's concerns about Legionellosis outbreak and possible connection to city's water
system"); id. app. V, at 8 (noting that Genesee County hospital officials met with staff from the Michigan
health and environmental agencies as well as the county health department to discuss the Legionellosis
outbreak).




particularly where responsibilities have been divided among numerous levels
and individual failures could be overlooked, potentially leading to collective
failure.
1. Comparative Advantages of Citizens, Local Governments, States, and
Federal Agencies
Many delegated governance regimes have operated for decades.
Substantially changing the levels of government responsible for carrying out
various regulatory tasks would require statutory revision or at least significant
change to agency policy. But where governments are designing these regimes
from scratch-and even for existing regimes-it is worthwhile to consider the
comparative advantages that different levels of government might bring to the
table. Although delegation occurs for many reasons unrelated to the goal of most
effectively carrying out the purposes of the statute (including, in some cases,
shifting the blame for difficult decisions to another level of government), this is
a worthy project in light of the fact that delegated governance r gimes operate
within statutory mandates.
The federalism literature has extensively explored these comparative
advantages. The traditional practical federalism argument for delegation is that
state and local governments are more familiar with local conditions and thus
better able to regulate,289 and they can implement regulation more effectively
because they are physically closer to the regulated entity and can therefore better
carry out inspection and enforcement activities. But as demonstrated by the EPA
staff member who drove a remote air pollution monitor near well sites in
290Colorado to determine micro-level emissions, federal agencies can
291
competently address very localized problems. Indeed, even with closer
consideration of various governments' characteristics, it is nearly impossible to
state that any one level of government will consistently be better at drafting and
promulgating regulations or monitoring and enforcing them.
Despite these difficulties, the fact that different levels of government have
historically tended to perform different functions suggests that certain expertise
might have built up at this level and would be worth drawing from. For example,
if a delegated governance regime requires, in part, regulatory solutions that
require changing traditional land use regulations, such as zoning laws, the fact
that local governments have been promulgating and enforcing these regulations
for so long and have resources built up in this area might suggest hat they should
manage this task. In the case of the SDWA and Flint, ensuring drinking water
289. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balance in the Interjurisdictional Grey Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 601 (2007).
290. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58
(2016) (describing numerous Army Corps of Engineers offices around the country in which staff work
closely with entities seeking permits to fill in wetlands and other waters).
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quality requires the operation of thousands of water treatment plants around the
country, and local governments, which have historically carried out this
function,292 are thus likely logical entities to involve in the regulatory project.
Beyond looking to governments' longstanding functions and expertise,
some additional generalizations about their advantages are at least marginally
helpful. For example, to the extent that federal agencies lack the resources to
have officials from Washington, D.C. or a regional office perform work like
driving to oil and gas sites to measure air emissions, Heather Gerken's
"federalism all the way down"293 approach suggests hat engaging nonprofits and
citizens in the monitoring and enforcement aspects of the regulatory project is
also key. STRONGER provides a beneficial example of environmental group
and industry involvement-as well as state and federal agency participation-in
monitoring the long-term performance of state programs in the oil and gas
context, although this process has limitations, as discussed in Section III.A.
Additionally, a large body of literature provides support for the concept that
delegating certain tasks to private entities in the regulatory process-rather than
294simply coordinating with them-will be beneficial in some cases. Particularly
where regulations require complex, technical understanding of the regulated
activity, industry actors have a great deal to contribute. For example, oil and gas
development involves technologies with which those outside of the industry are
often unfamiliar, such as special types of "blowout preventers" that help to
prevent uncontrolled pressure buildups and explosions during drilling and
295fracturing and a variety of other relatively complicated technologies. Those
who work in the industry or government officials who previously worked in
292. Local Gov't Advisory Comm., Clean and Safe Drinking Water, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY 5 (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/documents
/1gac water report_-final-draft_3.1.pdf [http://perma.cc/U7NQ-RXYL] (noting that local governments
"are experienced in overcoming challenges" associated with drinking water provision and identifying
ways to better serve their constituents).
293. Gerken, supra note 21, at 4.
294. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (exploring the advantages of involving regulated entities within the regulatory
process although also noting limitations); Dennis D. Hirsch, ProjectXL and the Special Case: The EPA's
Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 223-25 (2001) (describing Project XL, in which
industry engaged in various creative pilot projects to reduce the pollution while avoiding some of the most
stringent requirements under federal environmental statutes that apply to these pollutants, and lauding its
benefits); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Enhancing the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking by the U.S. Department of
Education, in RECALIBRATING REGULATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 90 app. IV (2015) (exploring how participation
ofnongovernmental entities in suggesting the content of rules through an advisory committee to an agency
can be beneficial). But see, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (noting that the claimed benefits of negotiated
governance have not been empirically proven); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the
Failure ofNegotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (similar); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 103, 124 (1998) (concluding that "Project XL has proved a disappointment to virtually all of its
outside constituencies").
295. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.406 (2017) (requiring a "double ram blowout




industry are likely to be most familiar with these technologies and those that are
likely to be most effective if required by regulation. Similarly, maintaining
electricity reliability requires an array of electrical equipment and operating
procedures with descriptions that hint at their complexity. For instance, to ensure
that an adequate amount of electricity is provided to nearly exactly match
instantaneous demand-the practice of "balancing" power-a NERC reliability
standard requires the following:
Each Balancing Authority [the entity responsible for ensuring adequate power to
meet demand] shall operate such that, on a rolling 12-month basis, the average of
the clock-minute averages of the Balancing Authority's Area Control Error
(ACE) divided by 1OB ([a frequency bias]) times the corresponding clock-minute
averages of the Interconnection's Frequency Error is less than a specific limit.2 96
297
This description is followed by a lengthy algebraic equation. For
regulatory areas like this, involving industry in drafting regulations can lead to
better regulation, although substantial safeguards against regulatory capture are
needed. Additionally, involving these entities in enforcement-as exemplified
by NERC-draws on their technical expertise in identifying the failures of
entities to comply with highly technical regulation.
The energy reliability case study from Part II shows some of the safeguards
that can be used to help prevent private actors from proposing or enforcing
inadequately stringent standards when regulatory tasks are delegated to them.
For example, NERC can only propose reliability standards, and FERC must
approve them; FERC often requires changes.298 Additionally, FERC reviews
each and every NERC enforcement action and does not take this job lightly, often
rejecting NERC's approach for a more stringent one.299 Additional safeguards
are available for agencies that use negotiated rulemaking-a process in which an
advisory committee convened by the agency proposes rules before the agency
submits those rules to the broader public for notice-and-comment rulemaking.3 00
Federal acts that encourage and enable this "reg-neg" process require certain
procedural measures that can help to guard against undue influence by any one
entity participating in the process, such as public disclosure of certain advisory
committee documents and formation of a representative advisory committee.30'
296. Standard BAL-001-0-Real Power Balancing Control Performance, NORTH AM.




298. See supra notes 231-232 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 233-234 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 294, at 1257 (describing the reg-neg process).
301. But see Wiseman, supra note 27, at 270 (noting inadequate inclusion of local
communities and rail safety groups in the advisory committee to the Federal Railroad Administration,
which promulgates regulations to prevent accidents such as the derailment and explosion of trains carrying
hazardous products).
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Some have argued that FERC's oversight is too close, particularly in
reviewing draft standards. These commenters believe that FERC's relatively
nondeferential approach to the standards is improper given the strong expertise
of the utility representatives and other participants in NERC standard-drafting
process who are intimately familiar with the highly technical details of the
302grid. But given the unusually strong involvement of a private entity in both
drafting and enforcing the standards, FERC's approach is likely necessary to
ensure that the public interest is adequately represented. When legislators and
administrators delegate so many regulatory responsibilities to a private entity,
they should consistently apply the most stringent of the oversight safeguards
noted in Section II.A., including case-by-case review of individual regulations
and enforcement, as well as regular review of the overall performance of the
entity with delegated authority.
Despite the advantages of relying on different types of government entities,
the Flint case study, in particular, highlights the dangers of involving multiple
entities in a regulatory project, including inadequate communication among
responsible entities and human errors that can lead to regulatory failure. The
following Sections discuss how these types of problems could potentially be
avoided, both through better coordination and the use of safeguards to reduce the
impact of human error within agencies.
2. Coordinating Actions Through Umbrella Organizations and Other
Mechanisms
Although much of the blame in the Flint crisis appears to fall on individual
regulators, the numerous entities involved in regulating the quality of drinking
water suggest that a coordinating entity might have helped some, particularly if
the officials within that organization had pieced together the numerous
individual warnings and recognized their significance. Here, there were several
"umbrella" entities that could have gathered the various parties and better
coordinated their actions, such as the Governor's office or the Michigan
environmental agency, as well as the EPA and its regional office. They failed to
play this coordinating role. When so many levels of delegation are involved,
clearer roles for umbrella organizations must be specified to ensure that the many
players are properly monitored and coordinated.
In some cases, a third-party "umbrella" organization may be needed to
oversee all of the entities, track their actions, and alert them to failures. This third
party could help to avoid the free riding and regulatory commons-type problems
that can occur among the entities within the delegated governance regime when,
for example, these entities incorrectly assume that another responsible ntity has
taken care of a problem. The interagency coordination literature has explored the
potential for existing or newly-formed entities to play this type of role,




particularly in the context of coordination among federal agencies. For example,
as explained by Michael Livermore and Richard Revesz, OIRA "circulates
proposed rules and the accompanying regulatory impact statements [statements
that described costs and benefits of regulations] to other agencies and solicits
their feedback on regulatory proposals."303 Agencies may then "weigh in and
express concerns about the regulatory actions being contemplated by other
agencies."304
A related solution based solely on information sharing would be for a
federal agency that delegated tasks to multiple levels of government to specify a
particular organization responsible for coordinating a website in which all parties
shared information on regulatory activities, including permits or variances
granted, new standards approved, and enforcement actions taken. An individual
at each organization would be assigned the task of regularly updating this
website. This format would create an electronic trail of data that would
potentially amplify concerns such as those raised by individuals from multiple
levels of government in the Flint crisis. A website that collectively tracked the
numerous warning e-mails, conference calls, and reports from all of these
individuals might have more quickly alerted officials to a real problem.
Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi have noted a variety of tools for inter-agency
coordination at the federal level that could potentially-and already sometimes
do-apply across different levels of government. For example, they note more
305formal tools, such as consultation mandates, and the less formal, more
common use of interagency memoranda of understanding (MOUs).306 Indeed, in
many contexts the federal government, tribes, states, and local governments use
these memoranda to coordinate their efforts, including in some delegated
governance regimes. For example, it is not uncommon for states, tribes, and the
federal government to enter into MOUs regarding the issuance and enforcement
of water quality permits under the Clean Water Act. In one MOU between the
EPA, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, and Idaho Department of Environmental
Quality, the tribes and IDEQ agreed to each independently write and revise water
quality standards for land on or adjoining tribal lands but to first provide notice
of intent to the other entity, then provide a notice of rulemaking and potentially
307provide technical support to the other entity. They also agreed to share water
308
quality and other information. More detailed MOUs, if implemented and
followed, could benefit all delegated governance regimes, although it may be
303. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 282, at 1367.
304. Id.
305. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 21, at 1192.
306. Id. at 1161.
307. Memorandum of Understanding for Water Quality Standards Between the
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency Region 10, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY 2 (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/rIO/water.nsf/34090d07b77d50bd88256b79006529e8/24053f0cfc7869a288257
4aa006bf017/$FILE/MOU%/o20for%/020WQS%/o20SB-IDEQ-EPA.pdf [http://perma.cc/5JQG-TJ2S].
308. Id. at 3.
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necessary to appoint one of the agencies in the MOU-or an independent body-
to coordinate implementation and ensure that all parties follow the MOU. As
Freeman and Rossi observe, there are several types of MOUs-some dividing
up jurisdiction, some committing to information sharing among agencies, and so
on.309 To improve delegation frameworks, particularly where numerous tasks
have been delegated to different parties, MOUs will likely need to include very
clear jurisdictional lines. And if the parties follow the centralized website
approach suggested here, the MOU should specify who will create and maintain
this website; which types of information will be shared, such as complaints
received about potential risks and inspections and enforcement actions taken;
and the frequency with which parties will enter data into the website.
3. Safeguarding Against Inevitable Human Error
A final challenge when regulatory tasks are parceled out to several levels
of government is the human error that occurs within agencies, which is partly the
result of internal principal-agent problems, and also the inevitable fact that
agencies run by humans will suffer human flaws. Agency officials and staff act
or fail to act for a variety of reasons, such as a commitment to using up scarce
political capital on the issues they care most deeply about or more personal
reasons like ambition or laziness.310 And in some cases officials and staff are not
properly trained or lack the resources to carry out their individual duties.
Regardless of the cause, agencies need to implement safeguards to prevent and
mitigate this failure-particular in the case of delegation and potential "error
pile-up." The private context provides useful essons here. Organizations such as
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations have detailed training modules for all
employees at nuclear plants that have proven highly effective.3 1' While
regulation is not always as high-stakes as an operation involving radioactive
material, similar, consistent raining and periodic review programs-albeit
lower-level programs that did not require as many resources-could aid
agencies.
A less rigorous but still relevant training example comes from the oil and
gas context. As noted in the RCRA case study, states have the majority of control
over the regulation of oil and gas development and the wastes associated with
that development. States have been quite assertive in attempting to maintain that
312role and have tended to lobby against federal action in this area. As part of
their effort to maintain regulatory control, many leading oil and gas states have
309. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 21, at 1162-63.
310. See Seidenfeld, supra note 108, at 263-64, 270-71.
311. See What We Do, INST. NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS, http://www.inpo.info
/AboutUs.htm#whatwedo [http://perma.cc/QQX4-A22H].
312. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 235, 262-63 (2014) (documenting state officials' assertions that they are effective regulators of




created a "States First" organization. As suggested by its name, a central purpose
of this organization is to persuade the public and the federal government that
states are the best regulators in the oil and gas context. But to try to help prove
this, the states have also embarked upon a collective effort to train the state
agency inspectors who visit oil and gas sites and look for problems, including
improper disposal of waste and potential pollution from that waste. The states
are working with academics to develop training programs that certify field
inspectors.313
It is not clear that adequate up-front training would have prevented the
multiple human errors that occurred in Flint. Many of these errors were the result
314of personal beliefs about the lack of credibility of citizen complaints and a
failure to acknowledge and correct mistakes brought to the attention of officials
by officials in several other levels of government. For example, one e-mail from
a Michigan Department of Environmental Quality official complains that he is
"not sure why region 5 [EPA] sees this one sample [showing lead in water] as
such a big deal."3 15 State environmental agency officials also attempted to shift
their responsibilities; as summarized by the team investigating the crisis ex ante,
one official reminded the county's health department-whose staff members had
repeatedly raised red flags-that an epidemiological investigation was their job
and indicated that the county should approach the Michigan health department
"if they need[ed] support."316 State environmental agency officials further
complained in e-mails about federal EPA "over-reaches," stating that the federal
Agency's "constant second-guessing of how we interpret and implement our
rules is getting tiresome."3 17 Addressing problems like these requires changing
the culture of an agency-a difficult task that can be accomplished only if
agencies have adequate resources to hire and retain staff committed to carrying
out their public mission and to maintain strong morale within the agency.
Understanding how to effectively design and operate delegated governance
regimes to ensure that these regimes achieve statutory mandates will be a long-
term project, and there is no single formula for success. Indeed, this Article has
only touched upon some of the factors that might help to improve how subfederal
entities carry out federal tasks and also ensure that federal actors are carrying
their weight. An overarching challenge is the resource question: none of these
suggestions can be implemented without adequate regulatory funding, and
agencies are chronically underfunded. Some tools above, such as involving
citizens in the monitoring process and industry in regulatory drafting, can help
313. Priorities, ST. FIRST (2014), http://www.statesfirstinitiative.org/priorities
[http://perma.cc/254U-TUJ9].
314. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality staff were "dismissive and unresponsive" when the federal EPA
offered to assist by providing lead experts).
315. Id. app. IV, at 9.
316. Id. app. IV, at 10.
317. Id. app. IV, at 12.
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shift some burdens away from agencies, but they still require agency oversight.
Mechanisms such as decoupling a larger portion of agency funding from
legislative budget approval and allowing agencies to raise more funds through
permit fees and similar agency-initiated charges could help, although these tools,
too, have their perils.318 Despite the many hurdles along the path to better
delegation, this Article endeavors to suggest how regulatory design might play a
role in creating better delegated governance regimes.
Conclusion
Delegation within the cooperative federalism sphere presents a scholarly
and practical conundrum: it is necessary yet highly dysfunctional. Part of this
dysfunction arises from the principal-agent relationship bound up within any
form of delegated governance, with federal agencies acting as principals and
states, local governments, or private entities carrying out various duties as
agents. There are of course numerous other challenges associated with delegation
that are not directly related to the classical principal-agent challenges of ensuring
that each party within the relationship fulfills its duties. But many of the
problems identified in the case studies here have principal-agent undertones.
Federal agencies frequently delegate substantial regulatory responsibilities
to subfederal actors without implementing regimes for effective long-term
monitoring and oversight of those actors. Additionally, delegation of several
types of regulatory tasks to several different government actors can result in
coordination problems in which regulatory failures do not come to light quickly
enough. And there is a risk that inevitable human error that occurs within
agencies can pile up. Federal agencies, in turn, sometimes do not uphold their
end of the bargain, and subfederal agents, too, need better tools for overseeing
their principals and working more effectively with federal agencies. A recent
manifestation of this dysfunction was a tragic one. City, county, state, regional,
and federal agencies, as well as private actors, all failed to protect thousands of
children in Flint, Michigan from the irreversible effects of lead poisoning.
Delegation's dysfunction calls for a theoretical framework that enables
productive analysis of the regulatory design of delegated programs and how to
improve this design. There are three key features of the regime that can
accentuate or limit the principal-agent challenge common to all forms of
delegation within cooperative federalism programs: the type and degree of
regulatory tasks delegated, the amount of control retained by the federal agency,
and the types of entities receiving delegated authority. Within each of these
categories, the case studies provided here highlight the opportunities and
challenging for improving the regulatory design of delegation.
318. For example, there is the risk that agencies will be incentivized to issue too many
permits simply to raise funds. Properly tailoring individual permit fees to cover the full expense of agency




With respect to the type of authority delegated, Congress and agencies must
carefully consider the comparative advantages of various levels of government
when choosing which tasks to delegate to whom. This category of analysis thus
blends into the question of whether private, local, state, or federal entities-or a
combination of them-should receive or retain delegated tasks. Nonprofit groups
and citizens can play important roles in the monitoring and enforcement tasks,
in particular, given their ability to provide the "boots on the ground" that
governments at all levels struggle to maintain under resource constraints. And
private entities have essential technical information that can assist in regulation
drafting if adequate safeguards against concerns such as capture are
implemented.
Regarding the degree of authority delegated or retained by the federal
agency, as more tasks are delegated to a greater number of actors, the agency's
role in coordinating and reviewing the actions of these entities becomes even
more critical. And both short-term case-by-case oversight and longer-term
program performance oversight is critical. In the case of Flint, citizens had
alerted the EPA that the State of Michigan's overall program for carrying out its
duties to protect drinking water was failing, but the Agency did not act.319
As emphasized in this Article, oversight responsibilities do not run one
way. If federal agencies fail in their duties as principals, either due to resource
constraints or a simple refusal to maintain responsibility for a regulatory program
despite a statutory mandate, motivated agencies must have adequate room to
conduct their own regulatory activities. Here citizen suits play an important role,
and citizen suit provisions may need to be expanded to allow challenges to both
the failure of federal and subfederal agents to perform nondiscretionary duties.
Many statutes already provide for the former type of review, but fewer allow for
the latter. Providing a judicial outlet to address situations in which federal
principals leave slack, and only some state agents are motivated to pick up that
slack, is important. Review agencies are similarly important in monitoring the
actions of both federal agencies and sub-level entities and ensuring the adequacy
of regulatory programs from a relatively apolitical perspective.
Much concrete work remains to be done in redesigning delegation within
existing cooperative federalism regimes, but this Article provides guidance for a
path forward. With serious revisitation of basic mechanisms for case-by-case
monitoring, long-term oversight, and improved coordination among all entities
within these governance approaches, regulatory failures like Flint could be
averted.
319. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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